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RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION: (RE) EMBRACING 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 
Hina B. Shah*
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains 
and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then 
say, “you are free to compete with all the others,” and still justly 
believe that you have been completely fair.1 
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of employment in this country is the history of racism.2
Using public and private mechanisms as well as violence to devise 
and enforce segregation and preferential treatment, the white male 
institutionalized an unprecedented advantage in the labor market.3  
Yet this is rarely acknowledged as a factor in the current widening 
economic disparity between whites and blacks.4  Today, many white 
Americans, cloaked in the myth of colorblindness and meritocracy, 
refuse to see the persistence of racial prejudice, disadvantage and 
discrimination in the labor market.5      
Racial discrimination against blacks has a singular, unique history 
in this country, which continues to shape their economic progress and 
* Hina B. Shah is an Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Women’s
Employment Rights Clinic at Golden Gate University School of Law.  I am grateful to
David Oppenheimer, Laura Cisneros, Rachel Van Cleave, Eric Christiansen, and
Ryan Nelson for their incisive comments on earlier drafts.  The paper was presented
at the Thirteenth Annual Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law,
September 2018.  Special thanks to Julia Morreale for expert research assistance.
1. Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: To Fulfill These
Rights (June 4, 1965), reprinted in IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-AMERICA
174 (2005).
2. See infra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
4. While there are disagreements on whether to capitalize “black” or “white,” I will
follow the majority of journalism-style guides and not capitalize either term.  See
Merill Perlman, Black and White: Why Capitalization Matters, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. (June 23, 2015), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/language_corner_1.php.
5. See infra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
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opportunities.6  For close to three centuries, whites systematically 
and rationally created an exclusionary system, enforced by the state 
and through violence, that disadvantaged and excluded blacks and 
other nonwhites to confer benefit on whites.7   Even after a bloody 
Civil War resulted in dismantling the 246-year-old American 
institution of slavery, racial exclusion and preferential treatment of 
whites persisted, including in employment.8  White men had access 
to the entire labor market, and the most desirable jobs were 
exclusively theirs, cocooned from competition.9  While the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, outlawing discrimination in employment, 
education, and public accommodation, dismantled many of the 
“formal barriers and symbolic manifestations of subordination,” 
racism persisted and remains a permanent feature of American 
society.10  Today, race discrimination in employment, while subtler, 
is still the norm and blacks are discriminated against “at a 
distressingly uniform rate.”11  A large body of empirical evidence 
demonstrates the pervasiveness of unconscious or implicit bias and 
discriminatory behavior.12  Race discrimination and segregation 
6. See infra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
7. DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 20 (1993); KEVIN STAINBACK & DONALD TOMASKOVIC-
DEVEY, DOCUMENTING DESEGREGATION: RACIAL AND GENDER SEGREGATION IN
PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 7 (2012); ROBERT HIGGS, 
Black Progress and the Persistence of Racial Economic Inequalities, 1865-1940,
in THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR
MARKET 23 (Steven Shulman & William Darity, Jr. eds., 1989); Johnson, supra note
1, at 177.
8. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 20; STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra
note 7, at 7; HIGGS, supra note 7, at 23.
9. See generally STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7 (referencing general
background information on post-Civil Rights Act employment in America).
10. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1378 (1988);
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 2–
3 (1992).
11. Lincoln Quillian et al., Meta-Analysis of Field Experiments Shows No Change in
Racial Discrimination in Hiring over Time, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 10870 (Oct.
10, 2017), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/114/41/10870.full.pdf.
12. Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in the Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field
Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 777–78 (2009) (providing relevant background
information on implicit bias against minorities in the workforce); Quillian et al., supra
note 11, at 10874; ARIN N. REEVES, WRITTEN IN BLACK & WHITE: EXPLORING 
CONFIRMATION BIAS IN RACIALIZED PERCEPTIONS OF WRITING SKILLS, NEXTIONS 
YELLOW PAPER SERIES 2, 6 (2014), http://nextions.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
written-in-black-and-white-yellow-paper-series.pdf (explaining a study which
unpacked implicit racial bias in a legal employment setting); Marianne Bertrand &
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continue to persist in the labor force, choking off opportunity to 
stable, life-long employment.13  Today’s widening disparity between 
black and white economic progress can be traced, in some measure, 
to “ancient brutality, past injustice and present prejudice.”14   
In the contemporary discourse, nondiscrimination and affirmative 
action are juxtaposed as contradictory doctrines.15  The argument that 
one cannot be colorblind and ensure equal opportunity while using 
race preferences is filtered through a majoritarian lens that discounts 
the long history of preferential treatment for whites.16    
By excluding blacks from a sizeable segment of the labor market 
for centuries, whites gained a systemic, locked-in advantage that 
continues to benefit them.17  Affirmative action provides a preference 
to blacks and other nonwhites as a counterweight to this historical 
advantage.18  Furthermore, affirmative action is a tool to combat the 
existence of current implicit bias in the labor market.19  By inserting 
race into conscious decision-making, it disrupts the subconscious 
biases that results in discriminatory decisions.20   
Historically, affirmative action was embraced as a means towards 
nondiscrimination.21  Civil rights leaders in the early twentieth 
century and during the Civil Rights Movement mounted direct action 
campaigns targeting employers to proportionally hire blacks.22  
Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and 
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 
991, 991–93 (2004) (giving relevant background information on inequality and 
discriminatory employment practices).  
13. Quillian et al., supra note 11, at 10874.
14. Johnson, supra note 1, at 177; see also MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING 
RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 102–03 (2003); LAWRENCE MISHEL ET
AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 69–70 (12th ed. 2012).
15. See RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE
LAW 14–15 (2013).
16. See Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination,
86 VA. L. REV. 727, 734 (2000) (discussing the systemic advantages that have been
afforded to white workers thanks to well over a century of monopolistic
discriminatory policies and practices in the American job market).
17. Id.
18. KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 11.
19. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
20. See Roithmayr, supra note 16, at 736.
21. See David Oppenheimer, Dr. King’s Dream of Affirmative Action, 21 HARV. LATINX 
L. REV. 55, 56–57 (2018).
22. See id. at 60; David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair
Employment Law: Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943-
1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1120 (2011); Gregory Hanson, The Affirmative Action
Requirement of Executive Order 11246 and Its Effects on Government Contractors,
206 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 48 
Affirmative action has long accompanied the government’s efforts 
towards  nondiscrimination.23  From the Freedman’s Bureau during 
Reconstruction to the executive orders mandating affirmative action 
in federal agencies and federal contracting, the federal government 
recognized affirmative action and nondiscrimination as compatible 
mechanisms to achieve equality.24  After the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, this country robustly engaged in forging a new 
path towards equality, rooting out systemic discrimination and 
promoting affirmative action based on race.25  Both public and 
private sector employers along with the judiciary embraced race-
conscious affirmative action programs that included timetables and 
numerical goals to increase the proportional representation of 
nonwhites in the workforce.26  These programs opened up the labor 
market for blacks to more skilled and higher paying occupations and 
had a direct impact on black economic progress.27    
The experiment was short lived however, as Ronald Reagan’s 
Administration unleashed a full scale retrenchment in both 
enforcement and commitment to affirmative action.28  Notably, while 
the Administration was bombastic about dismantling affirmative 
action, much of the federal affirmative action policies and programs 
survived, albeit narrower in scope.29  Nonetheless, the rhetorical 
assault on affirmative action successfully shifted the public dialogue 
Unions and Minority Workers, 32 MONT. L. REV. 249, 249 (1971); HERBERT HILL, 
BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK AND THE LAW 178–
79 (1977); HORACE CAYTON, LONG OLD ROAD: BACK TO BLACK METROPOLIS 237 
(1965). 
23. See, e.g., HILL, supra note 22, at 66–67; see also Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal
Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. 
U. L. REV. 477, 551–52 (1998).
24. HILL, supra note 22, at 66–67; Siegel, supra note 23, at 551–52.
25. See STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 142–44.
26. See discussion infra Section III.A.
27. JOHN BOUND & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, Black Economic Progress: Erosion of the
Post-1965 Gains in the 1980s?, in THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 34–35 (Steven Shulman & William Darity,
Jr. eds., 1989); RICHARD B. FREEMAN, Black Economic Progress After 1964: Who has
Gained and Why?, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 249 (Sherwin Rosen ed., 1981).
28. Elizabeth Bartholet, The Radical Nature of the Reagan Administration’s Assault on
Affirmative Action, Commentary, 3 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 37, 39–40 (1986).
29. See Claudia Withers & Judith A. Winston, Equal Employment Opportunity, in THE
CITIZENS’ COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990S 198 (Reginald C. Govan & William L. Taylor eds., 1989).
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and the private sector’s appetite for such programs.30  Today, 
affirmative action in private-sector employment is brushed aside as 
an untenable remedy, surely to be struck down by the United States 
Supreme Court.31  At first glance, the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
analysis of the validity of affirmative action programs under the 
Equal Protection Clauses is marred by historical amnesia and 
ideological instability.32  Many of these decisions are fractured and 
doctrinally unstable, resting on political ideology rather than 
grounded in historical and contemporaneous reality.33  But a close 
examination of affirmative action cases provides guidance in 
structuring viable race-based affirmative action programs that can 
withstand constitutional challenges.34  While the Supreme Court has 
narrowly and often inconsistently interpreted the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s tolerance for race-conscious remedies, it 
has not shut its door on affirmative action.35  The Court has 
consistently acknowledged that affirmative action remains a 
constitutionally viable remedy.36  The Supreme Court has also upheld 
affirmative action programs challenged under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment based on, 
among other things, race.37 
Although the Supreme Court’s many plurality and 5–4 majority 
opinions fail to provide a coherent doctrinal thesis,38 some clear 
answers emerge:   
1) Schools and universities can use race as a factor in
furtherance of diversity;39  
30. STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 155; Frank Dobbin & John R.
Sutton, The Strength of a Weak State: The Rights Revolution and the Rise of Human
Resources Management Divisions, 104(2) AM. J. SOC. 441, 455 (1998).
31. STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 167–69.
32. See Arthur J. Marinelli, Affirmative Action: A Divided Supreme Court, 22 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 99, 99–100 (1988).
33. See Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme
Court, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1179, 1179 (1996).
34. See id. at 1191–92.
35. See id. at 1198–99.
36. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210–11 (2016); Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 314 (2013); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270–
72 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301, 314 (1978) (plurality opinion).
37. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 635 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 (1979).
38. See Linda Novak, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 756, 758 (1980).
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2) Private employer can use race as a factor in designing
voluntary affirmative action programs, subject to certain 
limitations;40 
3) Local governments can use race as a factor in hiring
and contracting if a clear record is established of a history or 
ongoing practice of discrimination;41 
4) Federal government can require contractors to have
affirmative action plans for hiring and subcontracting, 
subject to certain limitations;42 
5) Public employers may take affirmative race-based
actions where there is strong basis in evidence of disparate 
impact liability;43 and 
6) Courts may order affirmative action that includes racial
quotas where discrimination has been established.44  
Today, the nascent progress on employment equality has stalled.45  
Race discrimination and segregated workforces are just as much a 
reality today as they were for much of this country’s history, 
contributing to widening economic disparity between whites and 
blacks.46  The time is ripe to lay the political and social groundwork 
to re-embrace affirmative action in private employment.47  It has 
been an effective remedy to integrate the workplace and increase 
black economic progress.48  Re-embracing affirmative action in 
private employment will require a recommitment by civil rights 
leaders, politicians, employers, unions, and workers to prioritize and 
reframe affirmative action as an antidote to discrimination and a 
counterweight to centuries of preferential treatment of whites.  
39. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210; Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 310; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270–71;
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342–43; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 372–73 (plurality opinion).
40. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641–42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
41. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511–12 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277–79, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion).
42. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980) (plurality opinion).
43. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586–87 (2009).
44. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (plurality opinion).
45. See STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 167.
46. See Judith Hellerstein & David Neumark, Workplace Segregation in the United
States: Race, Ethnicity and Skill, 90(3) REV. ECON. STAT. 475–76 (2008).
47. See STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 172–73, 176–77.
48. See, e.g., BOUND & FREEMAN, supra note 27, at 34–35; FREEMAN, supra note 27, at
249; Withers & Winston, supra note 29, at 208.
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A shift in the public discourse is feasible today thanks in large part 
to an already vital ongoing civil rights dialogue.49  Movements such 
as #BlackLivesMatter50 and #MeToo51 have profoundly shifted the 
frames used to discuss police brutality and sexual assault on 
women.52  Another movement, #Occupy53 has essentialized income 
inequality between the 1% and the 99%.54  When gay civil rights 
leaders embraced a new framing for gay marriage, it led to greater 
public acceptance and a legal revolution.55  Sustained public 
messaging defeated an anti-affirmative action ballot measure in 
Colorado.56  Public pressure can be the “spur or catalyst” for 
employers, unions and politicians to “eliminate . . . the last vestiges 
of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country’s history.”57    
In the past, robust federal enforcement of nondiscrimination and 
affirmative action oversight were a critical force on employers to 
integrate their workforce.58  Today, that environmental pressure will 
need to come from companies that are leaders in their industry and 
unions.59  Large employers already are champions of affirmative 
action in education and understand the value of a diverse 
49. See S.M., Black Lives Matter Broadens Its Scope, ECONOMIST (Aug. 4, 2016), https://
www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2016/08/04/black-lives-matter-broadens-
its-scope.
50. See What We Believe, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/what
-we-believe/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
51. See ME TOO., https://metoomvmt.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
52. See id.; S.M., supra note 49.
53. See About, OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited Dec.
20, 2018).
54. See id.
55. Carrie Wofford, Why Equality is Winning: Two Factors Caused Public Opinion on
Gay Rights to Shift So Quickly, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 26, 2014), https://
www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/carrie-wofford/2014/03/26/how-did-public-opinion-
on-gay-marriage-shift-so-quickly.
56. MICHELE S. MOSES ET AL., UNIV. OF COLO. AT BOULDER, INVESTIGATING THE DEFEAT 
OF COLORADO’S AMENDMENT 46: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRENDS AND PRINCIPAL 
FACTORS INFLUENCING VOTER BEHAVIORS 1–2 (2010), http://archives.civilrights.org/
publications/colorado-46/2010-11-12-defeat-of-amendment46-report-final.pdf.
57. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
58. See, e.g., BOUND & FREEMAN supra note 27, at 35, 46; FREEMAN, supra note 27, at
249; Withers & Winston, supra note 29, at 208.
59. See Labor Commission on Racial and Economic Justice, AM. FED’N L. CONGRESS
INDUS. ORGS. (Feb. 25, 2015), https://aflcio.org/about/leadership/statements/labor-
commission-racial-and-economic-justice.
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workforce.60  The Supreme Court, as well as federal and state 
affirmative action mandates for government contractors, already 
provide a road map for employers to voluntary adopt affirmative 
action plans, including race-conscious decision-making.61  Unions, 
who rely on black membership for their survival, have begun tackling 
racial equity within their movements.62  They can play a central role 
in including affirmative action plans in their collective bargaining 
agreement as well as moving the Democratic Party to re-embrace 
affirmative action.63    
This article is a call for a radical reconstruction of the private labor 
market through re-embracing affirmative action as an effective tool 
to achieve equality.  Part II traces the growing income and wealth 
disparity between blacks and whites and links the history of 
segregation and implicit bias in the labor market as a factor 
contributing to economic disparity.64  Part III is a historical account 
of the movement for racial equality, tracing the alliance between 
nondiscrimination and affirmative action and the triumph of equal 
opportunity (formal equality) over equality of outcomes (substantive 
equality).65  Part IV examines the legal justification and viability of 
affirmative action programs under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Title VII.66  Part V is a roadmap for how we can re-embrace 
affirmative action in the private employment sector, from reframing 
the dialogue to grassroots pressure on large employers and unions to 
adopt affirmative action plans that include race-conscious decision-
making.67 
60. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 02-241, 2003 WL 399056, at *8–9; Brief for
Amici Curiae Fortune-100 and Other Leading American Businesses in Support of
Respondents, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), No. 11-345, 2012 WL 3418831, at
*4–12; Brief for Amici Curiae Fortune-100 and Other Leading American Businesses
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 570
U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 6735839, at *5–7.
61. See infra Part IV.
62. See, e.g., Jake Rosenfeld & Meredith Kleykamp, Organized Labor and Wage
Inequality in the United States, 117 AM. J. SOC. 1460, 1461–63 (2012); AM. FED’N L. 
CONGRESS INDUS. ORGS., supra note 59; U.S.D.L. News Release USDL-18-0080 (Jan.
19, 2018); Mary K. O’Melveny, Achieving Diversity Within Unions 519, 527–32
(2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-aba-annual/
papers/2006/27.pdf.
63. See Rosenfeld & Kleykamp, supra note 62, at 1466.
64. See infra Part II.
65. See infra Part III.
66. See infra Part IV.
67. See infra Part V.
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While it seems quixotic to advocate for affirmative action in the 
midst of rising white supremacy and its imprimatur through state 
action,68 it is important to lay the groundwork for a radical 
reconstruction.  The fight over equality must include a demand for 
affirmative steps to combat discrimination.69  Lyndon Johnson 
provides a beacon of light on this issue; for the first twenty years as a 
Senator from Texas, Johnson voted against every civil rights measure 
that came up for a vote, including a bill to stop lynching.70  Yet, by 
the time he was president, he spearheaded the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act and forcefully advocated for affirmative action: 
We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just 
legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right 
and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.71 
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
AMERICA
Growing economic disparity between blacks and whites and the 
resurgence of racially homogenous workplaces has been well 
documented.72  While many are cautious to draw a direct link 
between widening income and wealth disparity to the existence of 
racial discrimination in the workplace, the history of slavery and 
segregation illustrate the preferences bestowed on white men in the 
labor market.73  Furthermore, a wealth of cognitive empirical 
research has aptly demonstrated how implicit bias forecloses 
employment opportunities based on race.74  The legacy of white 
preference and discrimination in the labor market is the economic 
chasm between the races.75 
68. See Sarah Begley, White Supremacist and Black Nationalist Groups Both Grew
During Trump’s First Year as President, TIME (Feb. 21, 2018), http://time.com/51686
77/donald-trump-hate-groups-splc/.
69. See discussion infra Section III.A
70. W. Gardner Selby, Lyndon Johnson Opposed Every Civil Rights Proposal Considered
in His First 20 Years as Lawmaker, POLITIFACT TEX. (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.
politifact.com/texas/statements/2014/apr/14/barack-obama/lyndon-johnson-opposed-
every-civil-rights-proposal/.
71. Johnson, supra note 1, at 175.
72. See STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 250–51.
73. See discussion infra Section II.A.1.
74. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
75. See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
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A. Growing Income and Wealth Disparity Between Blacks and
Whites
 “In far too many ways American Negroes have been another 
nation: deprived of freedom, crippled by hatred, the doors of 
opportunity closed to hope.”76 
To measure inequality, economists look at a variety of factors.  
Income,77 mobility,78 and wealth79 provide a prescient lens to 
understand disparities in employment and employment opportunities.  
By these three measures, there is a colossal divide between black and 
white families.80  The disparity between blacks and whites has been 
fluid, influenced in part by government policy and enforcement 
around discrimination.81       
1. Income Gap Historically Wide
If blacks were fully integrated into the economic mainstream and
racial discrimination declined, black incomes would be on par with 
whites.82  While exact historical figures are not available to capture 
income from the end of slavery to the beginning of World War II, 
blacks did make great strides in earning an income, accumulating 
wealth and to some extent upward mobility.83  However, the gulf 
between black and white economic progress remained large during 
this period.84  Under the best of circumstances, blacks would have 
needed to increase their income elevenfold by World War I to close 
the economic divide.85  With almost half of blacks out of work, the 
Great Depression decimated what little progress blacks had made, 
harkening to the economic prospects that blacks had at the end of 
Reconstruction.86 
76. Johnson, supra note 1, at 174.
77. Income, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Income is money received
through work and investment.  See id.
78. Mobility, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed.
1996).  Mobility is the likelihood of moving up or down the distribution of income.
See id.
79. Wealth, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Wealth is the sum of assets
minus liabilities (family bank account balances, stock holdings, retirement funds)
minus mortgages, credit card balances, outstanding medical bills, student loans, other
debts, at a point in time.  See id.
80. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 14, at 13.
81. See id. at 77–79.
82. Id. at 69.
83. See HIGGS, supra note 7, at 16.
84. See id. at 12.
85. Id.
86. See KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 13; see also HILL, supra note 22, at 175.
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From 1945 to 1972, black women were moving out of domestic 
services and farming to clerical, factories, and professional 
employment; black men were making inroads in professional and 
skilled crafts as well in the managerial ranks.87  While considerable 
gains were made by blacks in income after World War II, they still 
lagged behind whites.88  During this time, black family income was 
approximately half of white family income.89   
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resulted in blacks 
making rapid gains in education and accessing more diverse 
employment opportunities.90  As a result, the median black family 
income rose from 55% of white family income in 1965 to 62% by 
1970.91  Currently, black household income is stagnant, at 61% of 
white household income.92 
Income is in large part determined by continuous employment.93  
Blacks have more cyclical employment and higher rates of 
unemployment than whites.94  The unemployment gap between black 
and white males has expanded.95  In 1948, the white-black male 
employment gap was only four percentage points.96  From 1979 to 
2016, unemployment rates for black workers in the labor force were 
87. RICHARD B. FREEMAN, Changes in the Labor Market for Black Americans, 1948-72,
1973 BROOKING PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 67, 86 (1973); see BROWN ET AL., supra
note 14, at 70.
88. DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN AMERICA 10 (2010).
89. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORTS, INCOME IN 1965 OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1967);
MISHEL ET AL., supra note 14, at 68–69.
90. BOUND & FREEMAN, supra note 27, at 32; MISHEL ET AL., supra note 14, at 68.
91. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORTS, INCOME IN 1965 OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1967);
see BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2001 15–17 (2002).
92. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, 
INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016 7 (2017); see also Racial Gaps in
Household Income Persists, PEW RES. CTR. (June 21, 2016), http://www.pewsocial
trends.org/2016/06/27/on-views-of-race-and-inequality-blacks-and-whites-are-worlds
-apart/st_2016-06-27_race-inequality-overview-05/.
93. See Tomaz Cajner et al., Racial Gaps in Labor Market Outcomes in the Last Four
Decades over the Business Cycle, FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES 2017-071 1, 1–4
(2017).
94. Id. at 4.
95. Samuel Cohn & Mark Fossett, Why Racial Employment Inequality is Greater in
Northern Labor Markets: Regional Differences in White-Black Employment
Differentials, 74 SOC. FORCES 511, 512 (1995).
96. Id.
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6.4 percentage points higher than for whites during market expansion 
and 6.9 percentage points higher during recession.97  This gap cannot 
be explained by age, education or experience.98   
While blacks and whites in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century earned the same wages for unskilled labor, the earning gap 
widened between low-income blacks and whites in the 1980s.99  The 
disproportionate concentration of blacks in these occupations also 
greatly hampered their earning capacity.100  Currently, 53% of blacks 
make less than fifteen dollars an hour.101  Although most whites 
eventually leave low-wage jobs as they age, close to half of blacks 
over thirty-five are still employed in low-wage industries.102  
Wage differential also contributes to income disparity.103  Blacks 
earn less than they did in the 1970s and the gap has expanded the 
most between college-educated blacks and whites.104  In a recent 
study evaluating the earnings and demographic data of all Americans 
from 1989–2015, black men consistently earned less than white men 
in 99% of Census tracts, even when raised in similar socioeconomic 
backgrounds.105  Black men’s average hourly wages were 22.2% 
lower than those of white men in 1979 and that gap widened by 2015 
to 31%.106  The gap has also widened among women.107  Black 
women were catching up to white women in 1979, earning 95% of 
97. See MARY C. DALY ET AL., DISAPPOINTING FACTS ABOUT THE BLACK-WHITE WAGE
GAP 1 (Anita Todd ed., 2017), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2017-
26.pdf.
98. Id.  In fact, college-educated black men in the 1980s were almost three times more
likely to be unemployed as college-educated whites.  BROWN ET AL., supra note 14, at
80–81.
99. BROWN ET AL., supra note 14, at 82.
100. HIGGS, supra note 7, at 19–20.
101. ECON. POLICY INST., FEW REWARDS: AN AGENDA TO GIVE AMERICA’S WORKING POOR
A RAISE 6 (2016), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/Few_Rewards_
Report_2016_web.pdf.
102. Llezlie Green Coleman, Rendered Invisible: African American Low-Wage Workers
and the Workplace Exploitation Paradigm, 60 HOW. L.J. 61, 71 (2016).
103. See DALY ET AL., supra note 97, at 3.
104. See id. at 1, 4.
105. RAJ CHETTY ET AL., RACE AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
INTERGENERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1–2, 6 (The Equal. of Opportunity Project ed.,
2018), http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/assets/documents/race_paper.pdf;
Emily Badger et al., Extensive Data Shows Punishing Reach of Racism for Black
Boys, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/19/
upshot/race-class-white-and-black-men.html.
106. VALERIE WILSON & WILLIAM M. RODGERS III, BLACK-WHITE WAGE GAPS EXPAND 
WITH RISING WAGE INEQUALITY 3 (Econ. Pol’y Inst. ed., 2016), https://www.epi.org/
files/pdf/101972.pdf.
107. Id.
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the average white woman.108  But by 2015, the wages of black 
women declined to 82% of the average white woman.109   
2. Wealth Inequality Flagrantly Pronounced
After the Civil War, “blacks owned themselves, but the whites still
owned virtually all the tangible wealth.”110  At the time of the 
Emancipation Proclamation, blacks owned 0.5% of the total wealth 
in this country, and by 1990 that number had doubled to a meager 
one percent.111  Although whites had very little wealth accumulation 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the wealth disparity 
became flagrant due to federal policies that increased whites’ access 
to assets.112  Home ownership is a prime mode of wealth 
accumulation for most families.113  Thanks in large part to the federal 
government’s housing policies and the Servicemen’s Readjustment 
Act of 1944—commonly known as the GI Bill—whites substantially 
increased their wealth after World War II.114   A median white family 
had assets worth more than fifteen times what a median black family 
had.115       
In 1984, the median white household had a net worth of $39,135, 
compared to $3,397 for black households (9% of white 
households).116  By 2010, the median net worth of whites was 
$97,000 (a 60% increase) compared to $4,900 for black households 
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. HIGGS, supra note 7, at 16.
111. CONLEY, supra note 88, at 25.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 42.
114. In 1933, the federal government established the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation
(HOLC) to help families refinance their mortgages in default to avoid foreclosures.
CONLEY, supra note 88, at 36–37.  HOLC institutionalized “redlining” in
predominately black neighborhoods as too risky and ineligible for HOLC-sponsored
loans.  Id. at 36.  Thus, many blacks were left without means to refinance during the
Depression resulting in a loss of their homes.  Id.  After World War II, the Federal
Housing Authority along with the Veterans Administration, through the GI Bill,
provided low-interest, long-term loans for first time home buyers.  Id. at 37.  Fewer
than one percentage of mortgages were issued to blacks, while whites
overwhelmingly benefitted from the program.  Id.  See also KATZNELSON, supra note
1, at 164 (showing the resulting home value disparity between blacks and whites in
the 1980s); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (outlining a comprehensive account of
government housing policies that intentionally segregated blacks and whites).
115. CONLEY, supra note 88, at 1.
116. KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 164.
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(5% of white households).117  Racial inequality in wealth is far 
greater than the disparity that exists in wages and incomes.118   
This leads to generational poverty.119  One in four black 
households live in poverty today, double the rate of poverty among 
whites.120  More than two-thirds of black boys are raised by poor or 
lower-middle class families, while more than half of white boys are 
raised by rich or upper-middle class families.121  Almost 11% of 
white children who grew up in the bottom quintile rose to the top 
quintile while only 2.5% of black children in the bottom quintile 
did.122  Not being white also increases the chance of falling into 
poverty.123  There is significant backsliding by upper and middle-
income black children.  Of children born to parents in the top 
quintile, only 18% of black children remain in the top, compared to 
41.1% of white children.124 
B. Discrimination as a Factor in Racial Disparity
Economists have not been able to explain the large gap between
black and white earnings with easily measured characteristics such as 
education, age, and experience.125  Some have explained that 
discrimination plays a factor in the black-white gap, especially in the 
persistent differential in unemployment rates, although others caution 
that additional unmeasurable forces may contribute to the divide.126  
Despite the caution of some economists, historical and current 
empirical evidence point to the existence of race discrimination in the 
labor market.127  Blacks in this country have been free for less time 
117. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 14, at 376.
118. Id. at 385.
119. Id. at 375.
120. CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 92, at 12–13, tbl. 3; LINDA BURTON ET AL., State of the Union 2017: Poverty, 
PATHWAYS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 9 (2017).
121. Badger et al., supra note 105.
122. CHETTY ET AL., supra note 105, at 18; Badger et al., supra note 105; see also MISHEL
ET AL., supra note 14, at 155, fig. 3K.
123. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 14, at 420.
124. CHETTY ET AL., supra note 105, at 18; Badger et al., supra note 105; see also MISHEL
ET AL., supra note 14, at 140 (showing that 63% of black children in the bottom fourth
income distribution remained there as adults, while only 32.3% of white children
remained in the same bracket they found themselves in as children).
125. DALY ET AL., supra note 97.
126. ELLEN BERREY ET AL., RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAWS
PERPETUATE INEQUALITY 17 (2017); Cajner et al., supra note 93, at 7; DALY ET AL.,
supra note 97; CHETTY ET AL., supra note 105, at 6–7.
127. See infra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
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than they were enslaved.128  Most black Americans are only two to 
three generations away from slavery and only seven-tenths of a 
lifetime away from segregated workplaces, public transit, restaurants, 
and schools.129  While segregation was at its ugliest in the South, 
whites overwhelmingly supported racial segregation throughout the 
country.130  Social customs and norms, backed by the full force of the 
state’s police powers, enforced the separation of the races in every 
institution and space in America.131  The legacy of slavery and 
segregation coupled with existing discrimination has profoundly 
impacted income, upward mobility, and wealth accumulation for 
blacks.132   
1. White Preference and Systemic Segregation in Employment
Racial segregation and affirmative action for whites has been the
backbone of this country, “stamped from the beginning.”133  
Jefferson Davis, the future president of the Confederacy, stated on 
the floor of the U.S. Senate on April 12, 1860, that “[t]his 
Government was not formed by negroes nor for negroes” but “by 
white men for white men.”134   
The history of systemic, institutional discriminatory policies in 
employment begins with slavery.  Slavery was a lucrative financial 
system, where blacks were worth more as property than as free 
men.135  In the North, the treatment of blacks was better, but still 
128. In 1619, the first recorded slave ship landed in Jamestown, culminating in the
purchase of twenty Africans by the Governor of Virginia.  IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED
FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA 38
(2016).  Slavery was outlawed by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865.  U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII.
129. Diana Ramey Berry, Slavery in America: Back in the Headlines, CONVERSATION (Oct.
21, 2014, 5:54 AM), https://www.theconversation.com/slavery-in-america-back-in-
the-headlines-33004.
130. See infra Section II.B.1.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. This phrase is from a speech given by Jefferson Davis in the U.S. Senate where he
said that the inequality of the white and black races was “stamped from the
beginning.”  KENDI, supra note 128, at 3. 
134. Id.
135. See GAVIN WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH: REVOLUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN 
ECONOMY SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 19 (1986).  The average slave owner held nearly
two-thirds of his wealth in the form of slaves, and the value of slaves in Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina (cotton states) comprised nearly
60% of all agricultural wealth.  Id. at 19–20.
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discriminatory.136  Northern legislators traded the shackles of slavery 
for the shackles of overt discrimination.137   
From the end of slavery until the passage of the Civil Rights Act, 
segregation in employment was “nearly absolute.”138  Every former 
Confederate state immediately instituted Black Codes which required 
blacks to sign yearly contracts for employment that resembled 
slavery.139  Legislation restricting the employment of blacks in 
certain industries, coupled with strikes and violence over black hiring 
in skilled jobs, resulted in racial occupational segregation in the 
South for another 99 years.140  Whites routinely engaged in mob 
violence and individual assaults of blacks, against the threat of black 
labor competition or strikebreaking.141 
In the North, unions played a major role in carving out the 
workplace, reserving the most desirable jobs for white men.142  Black 
workers were relegated to mostly unskilled blue collar jobs, which 
were the hardest, dirtiest and lowest-paid jobs and were 
systematically denied white-collar or supervisory jobs.143  From the 
1880s to World War II, labor unions, though growing in power, 
remained stridently anti-black, and kept black workers out of their 
ranks and barred black employment in skilled trades as well as most 
non-manual employment.144  Blacks were excluded until 1930 from 
136. See KENDI, supra note 128, at 120.
137. Id.
138. See STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 7.
139. ERIC FORNER, THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION: IN CIVIL RIGHTS SINCE 1787: A 
READER ON THE BLACK STRUGGLE 105–06 (Jonathan Birnbaum & Clarence Taylor
eds., 2000).
140. See, e.g., HILL, supra note 22, at 11–16; STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra
note 7, at 7; WRIGHT, supra note 135, at 68–70; HIGGS, supra note 7, at 22.
141. STEWART E. TOLNAY & E. M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930 57 (1995); Cornelius Christian, Lynchings, Labour
and Cotton in the US South: A Reappraisal of Tolnay and Beck, 66 EXPLORATIONS IN 
ECON. HIST. 106, 109 (2017) (indicating that violence was also inspired by the
psychosexual motivation to keep white women pure).
142. HIGGS, supra note 7, at 23.
143. BROWN ET AL., supra note 14, at 70.  Segregation greatly limited earning capacity.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427 (1971) (showing that blacks at
Duke Power Co. were only employed in the Labor Department, where the highest
paying jobs paid less than the lowest paying jobs in the other four departments, where
only whites were employed).
144. HILL, supra note 22, at 16, 20 (1977); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 28
(explaining that some have attributed union racism to the fact that blacks were often
recruited as strikebreaker, but unlike blacks, unions actively recruited and absorbed
each new set of European immigrant even though they were also used as
strikebreakers by employers); Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1375.
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most skilled craft unions in the American Federation of Labor.145  
With a more leftist and inclusionary leadership, the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) was a countervailing force, with 
participation rates of blacks almost double that of AFL membership 
by the beginning of World War II.146  But even the CIO had 
segregated locals in the South.147  Unions only began to fully 
integrate and end overt discriminatory practices as a result of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.148 
Most employers and unions throughout this country legitimated 
and enforced white male preferences, including the federal 
government, which created a segregated workforce under the tacit 
auspices of Woodrow Wilson.149  Prior to the Wilson Administration, 
employment in the federal government meant advancement and 
social power for blacks.150  More than four hundred blacks worked as 
white-collar clerks, including supervisory positions, in the federal 
government before Wilson.151 
Championed first by Wilson’s Postmaster General, many federal 
government departments became segregated after Wilson took 
office.152  Blacks were downgraded to lower positions and obtaining 
a civil service job became more difficult.153  The color line was 
maintained thoroughly, from separate workstations to separate toilets 
and eating areas.154  Advancement for blacks summarily ended, and 
they were downsized to custodial, menial, and junior clerical 
positions.155   
145. DESMOND S. KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE US 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 8 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
7, at 28.
146. Rosenfeld & Kleykamp, supra note 62, at 1466.
147. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 7, at 28.
148. Rosenfeld & Kleykamp, supra note 62, at 1466.
149. STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 7; Tom Shoop, When Woodrow
Wilson Segregated the Federal Workforce, GOV’T EXEC. (Nov. 20, 2015), https://
www.govexec.com/federal-news/fedblog/2015/11/when-woodrow-wilson-segregated-
federal-workforce/123913/.
150. ERIC S. YELLIN, RACISM IN THE NATION’S SERVICE:  GOVERNMENT WORKERS AND THE
COLOR LINE IN WOODROW WILSON’S AMERICA 4 (2013) (ebook).
151. Id.
152. KING, supra note 145, at 4; Deaana Boyd & Kendra Chen, The History and
Experience of African Americans in America’s Postal Service, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L 
POSTAL MUSEUM, https://postalmuseum.si.edu/AfricanAmericanHistory/p5.html (last
visited Dec. 20, 2018).
153. KING, supra note 145, at 4.
154. See id. at 29.
155. See id. at 4.
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Government policies of the 1930s and 1940s were structured either 
explicitly or through their implementation to advantage white males 
in the labor market.156  In the 1930s, northern and southern 
Congressmen joined forces to pass sweeping legislation that 
expanded prosperity to millions of white Americans.157  Several New 
Deal legislations excluded two main industries of black employment: 
agricultural workers and domestic servants.158  During this time, 
three in four blacks lived in the South.159  Further, 40% of laborers in 
the agricultural industry in the South were black and 55% were 
sharecroppers.160  In 1958, one third of nonwhite women were 
employed as domestics.161  These workers did not reap the benefits of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which established a national 
floor for minimum wage and overtime premium pay, eliminated 
regional wage differences and treated most industries the same.162  
Similarly, the Social Security Act of 1935, which created a welfare 
safety net for old age, also excluded agricultural workers and 
domestic servants.163  The Act initially excluded 65% of blacks, and 
as high as 80% in some parts of the South.164  In its first twenty-five 
years, the Social Security Act was “characterized by a form of policy 
apartheid.”165   
The G.I. Bill, which provided education and training programs for 
returning veterans, exacerbated the economic and educational 
opportunities between blacks and whites after World War II.166  One 
156. See KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 53, 55.
157. See id. at 53–55.
158. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (defining employees covered under the National
Labor Relations Act); KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 27; Peggie R. Smith, Organizing
the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and Approaches to Employee
Representation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 45, 63–64 (2000); Phyllis Palmer, Outside the Law:
Agricultural and Domestic Workers Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 J. POL’Y 
HIST. 416, 419–20 (1995).
159. KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 30.
160. Id.
161. Randy P. Albelda, Occupational Segregation by Race and Gender, 1958-1981, 39 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 404, 406 (1986).
162. Hina Shah & Marci Seville, Domestic Worker Organizing: Building a Contemporary
Movement for Dignity and Power, 75 ALB. L. REV. 413, 424 (2011).
163. See KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 42–43.
164. Id. at 43.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 84, 114.  Close to one million black men served in segregated military units
during World War II, most in the Army and Navy.  Sarah Turner & John Bound,
Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the G.I. Bill and World War II
on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans, 63 J. ECON. HIST. 145, 147–48
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in every twelve on-the-job training programs was open to blacks in 
the South.167  Segregated public vocational schools in the South had 
limited spots and provided limited training in fields such as tailoring 
and dry cleaning.168  Private vocational schools, which proliferated 
after the war, provided substandard training for blacks and were often 
exploitative.169  Training in higher skill trades, such as radio and 
electrical work, machine shop, mechanics, and carpentry and 
woodwork, were entirely closed off to blacks.170 
The United States Employment Services (USES) helped veterans 
find jobs and played an active role in the labor market.171  In the 
South, USES job centers did not place any black veterans in skilled 
employment, despite their training and experience in the military.172  
USES job centers in the North channeled blacks into unskilled jobs 
as well.173  Of the veterans that USES helped find non-farm jobs, 
92% of unskilled positions were filled by blacks.174   
Blatantly discriminatory hiring and compensation policies 
continued during the post-war manufacturing boom.175  Immediately 
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act and peak government 
enforcement, segregation in the workplace declined strongly.176  
Black women worked in the same jobs as white women, making 
almost the same amount of money.177  Both black men and black 
women made strong gains in professional jobs.178  White men 
continued to dominate the managerial and skilled crafts jobs, but 
blacks did make inroads.179  Thanks to the affirmative action mandate 
in federal contracting, black men made larger gains in professional, 
(2003); see also Siegel, supra note 23, at 551 (discussing segregation in the context of 
education and the military).  
167. KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 135.
168. Id. at 136–37.
169. See id. at 137.
170. Id. at 136–37.




175. See Albelda, supra note 161, at 407 (describing the vast occupational differences and
indices between nonwhite and white women).
176. See STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 128.
177. See id. at 128 fig.4.4; see also WILSON & RODGERS, supra note 106, at 3.  In 1958,
black women were unlikely to be employed in the same occupations as white women.
See Albelda, supra note 161, at 407.
178. STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 136.
179. See id. at 135–36.
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managerial and craft jobs with federal contractors than in non-
contracting firms.180   
By the 1980s, black racial integration with white men came to a 
halt and re-segregation between white and black women increased, 
due to the Reagan Administration’s weakened oversight and 
enforcement.181  Sorting by race continues to exist in the labor market 
today.182  A recent study of large private sector firms over a forty 
year period found that racial segregation is higher today than a 
generation ago.183  Blacks, along with other nonwhites, are 
overrepresented in low-wage industries.184  While 80% of people 
employed in managerial, professional and related professions are 
white, a high percentage of people employed as taxi or bus drivers, 
telemarketers, personal care aides, and barbers are black.185 
Occupational race segregation cannot be explained away as a 
matter of preference, skill acquisition or even schooling.186  
Competitive threats increased preference for white men.187  A 10% 
increase in the number of women or nonwhites in the labor pool 
resulted in a 30%–45% increase in white male representation in 
managerial positions.188  A similar effect is seen in skilled craft jobs, 
where there is a dramatic increase in white male representation as the 
labor pool diversifies.189   
2. Most Employers Harbor Implicit Bias
An extensive body of social science research has demonstrated the
existence of unconscious or implicit cognition and how it influences 
human behavior.190  All individuals harbor bias.191  While some are 
180. See id. at 142–44.
181. See id. at 131, 146, 167.
182. See John-Paul Ferguson & Rembrand Koning, Firm Turnover and the Return of
Racial Establishment Segregation, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 445, 446 (2018).
183. Id.
184. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES 11. 
EMPLOYED PERSONS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC OR LATINO 
ETHNICITY 1, 5–6, 10 (2017), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.pdf.
185. Id.
186. See Hellerstein & Neumark, supra note 46, at 475.
187. See STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 208.
188. Id. at 198.
189. Id. at 199.
190. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the
Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010).  For a more in-depth discussion of implicit bias,
see generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social
Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995),
which analyzes the interaction between implicit mode, and explicit mode to suggest
social judgment and cognition.
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overt and intentional, many of these biases are tucked away in our 
subconscious.192  Implicit cognition creates preferences for groups 
(positive or negative) that often operate outside of conscious 
awareness and are based on attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes; 
these preferences develop early in life and strengthen over time.193  
Social scientists, through empirical research, have demonstrated that 
contemporary discrimination is a result of unconscious, in-group 
preferences and institutionalized in organizational routines rather 
than conscious, intentional, out-group animosity.194   
A field experiment conducted in 2001 and 2002 sent out 5,000 
resumes to 1,300 help-wanted ads for a whole host of jobs–from 
cashier to sales management–in the Chicago and Boston area.195  The 
study randomly alternated between stereotypically “white-sounding” 
names, like Emily and Greg, and “African-American-sounding” 
names, like Lakisha and Jamal.196  For each ad, the study sent a total 
of four resumes: two higher quality resumes with slightly better 
experience, fewer gaps in employment and other positive variables; 
and two lower quality resumes, assigning a higher quality and lower 
quality resume to each racial group.197  Both sets of resumes had the 
same educational level, a college degree.198   
The study found large racial disparity in callback rates.199  It took 
twice as many mailings for Lakisha and Jamal to get a callback than 
Emily and Greg.200  The callback ratio of a white-sounding name was 
equivalent to having eight additional years of experience.201  The 
study also found that experience made no difference for black 
191. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128–
31 (2012).
192. See id.
193. See e.g., id.; Gregory Mitchell, An Implicit Bias Primer, 25 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 27,
30 (2018); Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 190, at 4–5.  Self-esteem is the positive
attitude towards one’s self and the objects or traits linked to one’s self.  Id. at 10.
Stereotypes are socially shared sets of generalizations about members of a social
category.  Id. at 14.  Attitudes are predisposed favorable or unfavorable dispositions
towards objects.  Kang & Lane, supra note 190, at 469.  They are what we “like and
dislike, favor and disfavor, approach and avoid.”  Id.
194. STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 164.
195. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 12, at 991, 996.
196. Id. at 992.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 995.
199. See id. at 997–99.
200. See id. at 997–98, 1008 tbl.8.
201. Id. at 998.
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employment opportunity.202  While whites with higher quality 
resumes received 27% more callbacks than whites with lower quality 
resumes, higher quality resumes assigned black sounding names had 
an 8%–9% increase in callback rates compared to lower quality 
resumes of blacks–a statistically insignificant number.203  The study 
concluded that racial discrimination plays an important role in the 
labor market and the level of discrimination is remarkably uniform 
across a variety of occupations and job requirements.204 
Even in low-wage jobs, there is a clear racial hierarchy, with blacks 
the furthest down.205  A field study conducted in New York City in 
2004 sent out white, black and Latino male testers to apply for entry-
level jobs over nine months.206  The first cohort of testers had 
identical resumes as high school graduates with steady entry-level 
employment.207  In this cohort, the white tester received a call back or 
job offer 31% of the time, compared to 15.2% for the black tester.208  
In the second cohort, the resumes were identical, but only the white 
tester had a felony and was out on parole.209  The white testers with a 
criminal record still fared better (17.2% positive employer responses) 
than blacks without a criminal record (13% positive employer 
responses).210  While there were only a few instances of overt racial 
animus or hostility towards the nonwhite testers, a qualitative 
analysis of the interactions between the testers and employers 
indicated that blacks were either categorically excluded from 
consideration, assessed as not having relevant experience, and/or 
channeled into lower-level jobs.211    
A meta-analysis of twenty-four published and unpublished field 
experiments, similar to the Emily and Lakisha study, conducted over 
the last twenty-five years and representing over 54,318 applications 
for 25,517 positions showed hiring discrimination against blacks as a 
consistent and significant presence in the labor market.212  In fact, the 
meta-analysis concluded that there has been no observable change in 
the level of hiring discrimination against blacks.213   
202. See id. at 1000–01.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 1010.
205. Pager et al., supra note 12, at 793.
206. Id. at 781.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 784.
209. See id. at 782.
210. Id. at 785.
211. Id. at 792–93.
212. Quillian et al., supra note 11, at 10871.
213. Id.
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A study conducted in the legal profession found that evaluating an 
employee’s work product is also infused with unconscious bias.214  
The study recruited firm partners to evaluate a memo written by a 
hypothetical third-year litigator.215  All of the partners received the 
same memo, but half were told that the associate was a black male 
while the other half were told the associate was a white male.216  The 
memo identified as written by a black associate received an average 
rating of 3.2 out of 5; the one identified as written by a white 
associate received a 4.1 out of 5 rating.217  The comments were also 
more positive for the white associate than the black associate.218  On 
the memo perceived to be written by a white male, the partners wrote 
“generally good writer, but needs to work on”; “good analytical 
skills”; and “has potential.”219  The memo perceived to be written by 
a black male received comments such as, “needs lots of work” and 
“can’t believe he went to NYU.”220   
The pervasive and pernicious effect of implicit bias has 
categorically excluded blacks from a broad range of jobs in the labor 
market.221  Even once they are hired, blacks continue to experience 
both explicit and implicit discrimination.222  Racial discrimination in 
the labor market is still prominent.223  In a nationwide survey of adult 
workers, 28% of blacks said they had been treated unfairly because 
of their race, compared to 6% of white workers.224  With respect to 
promotions, 56% of black workers believed that they were passed 
over for a promotion based on race.225  Discrimination against blacks 
is not disappearing or even gradually diminishing.226  
214. See REEVES, supra note 12, at 5.
215. Id. at 2.
216. Id.




221. See BERREY ET AL., supra note 126, at 32–33.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 32.
224. K.A. DIXON ET AL., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: HOW AMERICANS VIEW DISCRIMINATION
AND RACE ON THE JOB 11 (2002), http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/
products/uploads/A_Workplace_Divided.pdf.
225. Id. at 15.
226. See Quillian et al., supra note 11, at 10874.
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III. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY OUTWEIGHS EQUALITY OF
OUTCOMES
 “To this end equal opportunity is essential, but not enough, not 
enough.”227 
A. Affirmative Action as a Means Towards Nondiscrimination
Nondiscrimination and race-based affirmative action were and
continue to be presented as diametrically opposed ideas.228  In the 
early twentieth century, mainstream black civil rights organizations 
like the NAACP publicly opposed quota-based hiring in favor of fair 
employment.229  The binary choice is between the complete 
prohibition of discrimination, on one hand, and preferential treatment 
based on race, on the other hand.230  The argument in favor of one, in 
the often contentious public dialogue, cannot accommodate the 
other.231  Yet this debate wipes away a historical record of the 
alliance between nondiscrimination and affirmative action.232 
Nondiscrimination mandates that all persons have equal 
opportunity to be hired, promoted, compensated, and treated in the 
same manner.233  The nondiscrimination jurisprudence has developed 
to define discrimination as an intentional, conscious, discrete act.234  
Discrimination then is about bad actors taking adverse actions 
consciously based on race.235  Nondiscrimination, on the other hand, 
ensures a colorblind system of equal opportunity.236  By outlawing 
discrimination, it assumes that a person starts on equal footing and 
that merit, rather than skin color, will determine employment 
competition.237       
Conversely, affirmative action inserts race as a salient factor in 
employment decision-making.238  It advantages those who have been 
historically disadvantaged and continue to be disadvantaged because 
227. Johnson, supra note 1, at 175.
228. See KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 14–15; BERREY ET AL., supra note 126, at 36–37.
229. Engstrom, supra note 22, at 1125–26.
230. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1337.
231. See id. at 1334, 1342–43.
232. See, e.g., KATZNELSON, supra note 1, at 143, 145.
233. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
234. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV.
91, 112 (2003) (describing disparate treatment theory as focusing on the state of mind
of an individual at a discrete point in time).
235. Id.
236. See Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1345–46.
237. See id.
238. BERREY ET AL., supra note 126, at 36.
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of their race by giving them an equalizing preference in the 
employment setting.239  Affirmative action inherently recognizes that 
those who have been excluded for centuries from equal opportunity 
and who currently face discrimination in the labor market do not 
have a fair chance without some limited assistance.240   
This preference is negligible in the market because of the ongoing 
advantage that slavery, segregation, and present-day bias confer on 
whites.241  Economists have demonstrated that historical events that 
produce even a slight advantage in the formation of an industry can 
have long-lasting effect on market outcomes.242  The path 
dependence economic theory is equally useful in understanding how 
historical and current discrimination against blacks continues to 
shape lock-in advantage for whites in employment.243  Slavery, 
segregation, and bias created positive feedback loops that produced 
monopolies in schools, housing, and employment.244  While a 
concerted effort was expended after the Civil Rights Act to provide 
blacks with preferential treatment, the period was too brief to have a 
significant course correction for the lock-in effect of white 
dominance in the labor market.245  Justice Blackmun recognized that 
the broad remedial purpose of Title VII supported voluntary 
affirmative action plans as a remedy to the lock-in effects of 
segregation for which Title VII provided no remedy.246  Dominance 
in the market also leads to de facto dominant group norms.247  White 
normative merit standards then became a barrier for entry for 
nonwhites, making white employment monopolies more durable.248  
239. See id.; see also KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 11 (discussing the racist mistreatment
blacks have suffered “at the hands of the federal government, state governments, local
governments, and private parties” which has continued “since at least the Civil War”).
240. See KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 11.
241. See Roithmayr, supra note 16, at 754–55.
242. See id. at 742–43 (tracing the dominance of the QWERTY keyboard on historical
trends).
243. See id. at 745–46.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 788.
246. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 215 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
247. See Roithmayr, supra note 16, at 736.
248. See id. at 775 (“A barrier to entry is ‘defined as a cost . . . borne by a firm which seeks
to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry.’”) (quoting
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1970)); see also Crenshaw,
supra note 10, at 1379 (discussing how the white normative standard has been used to
cast blacks as lazy, ignorant, and lacking in strong work ethic to rationalize their
economic subordination).
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Thus, racial disparities are locked-in to the market even in the 
absence of intentional discrimination.249  It is no surprise, then, that 
there are both continuing employment segregation and income 
differences based on race, even when controlling for education and 
skill.250  Affirmative action is seen as a tool to adjust the systemic 
advantage that whites received throughout the history of this 
country.251   
Affirmative action also neutralizes subtler forms of 
discrimination.252  As Part II, supra, demonstrates, there is ample 
evidence to show that bias and stereotypes operate on an unconscious 
level and taint all interactions in the workplace.253  By making race 
explicit, affirmative action short-circuits implicit bias, which the 
nondiscrimination jurisprudence has been ill-equipped to reach.254   
From the onset, nondiscrimination and affirmative action have 
been intertwined to guarantee equality for former slaves.255  The 
Reconstruction Congress saw no conflict espousing 
nondiscrimination and mandating preferential treatment for blacks.256  
The Bureau of Freedmen, Refugees and Abandoned Lands 
(Freedmen’s Bureau), established in 1865 and renewed annually until 
1872, was a massive federal assistance program in the South that 
protected blacks from economic exploitation.257  The Freedmen’s 
Bureau was seen as necessary to effectuate the rights granted by the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and other 
subsequent civil rights legislation.258   
After this brief period, very little attention was paid to equality in 
employment.259  Not until the eve of World War II and only under 
threat of a massive march on Washington did the federal government 
249. Roithmayr, supra note 16, at 788.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 796.
252. See id. at 787–88, 793–96.
253. See supra Part II; see also Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 469 (2001) (“The
glass ceiling remains a barrier for women and people of color largely because of
patterns of interaction, informal norms, networking, training, mentoring, and
evaluation, as well as the absence of systematic efforts to address bias produced by
these patterns.”).
254. See Roithmayr, supra note 16, at 730–32, 793–96.
255. See Siegel, supra note 23, at 556.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 558; HILL, supra note 22, at 66–67.  The Freedmen’s Bureau governed
contractual terms including setting a fair price for labor.  Id. at 67.
258. Id. at 69.  The Civil Rights Act of 1866, among other things, forbade discrimination
based on race and color in every state and territory of the United States.  Id.
259. See Hanson, supra note 22, at 249.
2019 (Re) Embracing Affirmative Action in Private Employment 229 
act to prohibit discrimination in employment.260  President Roosevelt 
issued Executive Order 8802 prohibiting discrimination by federal 
agencies in vocational and training programs for defense production 
and by private defense contractors.261  Subsequent executive orders 
expanded the nondiscrimination coverage to all federal contractors 
and federal agencies.262  President Kennedy made the first explicit 
mention of affirmative action in Executive Order No. 10925, which 
reaffirmed the prohibition of discrimination and mandated that 
federal contractors “take affirmative action.”263   
Soon after the passage of Title VII, President Johnson issued 
Executive Order 11246, reaffirming federal contractors’ duty to not 
discriminate and to take “affirmative action” to ensure equal 
opportunity.264  This affirmative action mandate remains intact 
today.265  Federal contractors must adopt affirmative action plans 
with detailed statistical and narrative components, and “design 
‘goals, timetables and affirmative action commitments’ to correct any 
identifiable deficiencies.”266  The federal government has long 
viewed affirmative action as a “management tool designed to ensure 
equal employment opportunity.”267  The central premise of the 
affirmative action mandate is to ensure nondiscrimination.268  The 
affirmative action regulations specifically note that without 
discrimination, an employer’s work force should reflect the 
proportional representation along race and gender of the available 
workforce.269   
260. Id.; HILL, supra note 22, at 178–79.  Blacks faced widespread discrimination in
defense industries, outright exclusion in training programs, and a segregated armed
force.  See Hanson, supra note 22, at 249; see also Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg.
3109 (June 25, 1941).
261. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25, 1941); HILL, supra note 22, at 178–
79; Hanson, supra note 22, at 249.
262. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965); Exec. Order No. 9346,
8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (May 27, 1943); HILL, supra note 22, at 179.
263. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (March 6, 1961).
264. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965).  Subsequent executive
orders consolidated contract compliance under the Secretary of Labor.  E.g., Exec.
Order No. 12,086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,501 (Oct. 5, 1978).
265. See Exec. Order No. 12,086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,501 (Oct. 5, 1978).
266. Hanson, supra note 22, at 255 (citing 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1970)).
267. Compare 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10(a)(1) (1970) with 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10(a)(1) (2018)
(showing that the language used to describe the general purpose of federal affirmative
action programs has not changed in nearly fifty years).
268. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10(a)(1) (2018).
269. Id.
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In 1967, the federal government took an even bolder step.270  To 
rectify the persistent discrimination of non-whites in trade unions in 
Philadelphia, the Department of Labor issued the Philadelphia Plan 
requiring affirmative action in government contracts in the city of 
Philadelphia.271  Though it was limited in geographic scope and dealt 
with only a few trades, the Plan set hiring goals, after public 
hearings, for nonwhite workers at 4%–6% for the employer’s 1970 
work force, which increased to a high of 20% in each trade after four 
years.272  A federal contractor had to make a good faith effort to 
broaden recruitment to meet the hiring goals.273  The Nixon 
Administration lobbied vigorously for Congress to approve the plan, 
which it did in 1969.274  The federal government instituted similar 
plans in other cities.275  The courts overwhelmingly found these 
Philadelphia-type plans constitutional and consistent with the 
mandates of Title VII to ensure equal opportunity.276  As one district 
court observed, “[i]t is equally clear that if this plan is properly 
administered, it will be a plan of inclusion rather than exclusion.”277 
Affirmative action in private employment was a court-ordered 
remedy where employers were found to discriminate under Title 
VII.278  Courts ordered employers to hire minority employees up to
30% of the total workforce,279 to hire one minority worker every time
two white workers were hired,280 and give black and Spanish-
270. See Paul Marcus, Comment, The Philadelphia Plan and Strict Racial Quotas on
Federal Contracts, 17 UCLA L. REV. 817, 819 (1970).
271. Id. at 817.
272. Id. at 819–20.
273. Id. at 821.
274. See id. at 821–24.
275. Hanson, supra note 22, at 257.
276. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builders Ass’n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 1971),
aff’d, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972) (upholding the Illinois Plan); Joyce v. McCrane,
320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970) (upholding the Newark Plan); Weiner v. Cuyahoga
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 249 N.E.2d 907 (Ohio 1969) (upholding the Cleveland Plan);
Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
aff’d, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971) (upholding the Philadelphia Plan); see also
Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 11, 21 (1st Cir.
1973) (upholding a state plan requiring the hiring of 20% minorities on state
contracts).
277. Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., 311 F. Supp. at 1010.
278. There are numerous consent decrees imposing affirmative obligations after a finding
of discrimination and only a few are highlighted.  See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison
Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 92–93, 109–10, 118–22 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev’d, Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated,
431 U.S. 951 (1977).
279. See id. at 122.
280. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971).
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speaking applicants for police positions priority in future hiring.281  
Where a promotion examination had a strong basis in evidence of 
disparate impact, a district court imposed as part of a consent decree 
the hiring of nonwhite employees who scored lower on the exam.282  
The Eleventh Circuit upheld a consent decree that created a special 
promotion list of qualified plaintiffs who had been discriminated 
against and the Air Force was required to alternate between the 
special list and a general list in making promotion decisions in 38 
target positions.283  The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 plurality, upheld a 
one to one hiring quota to promote blacks imposed by the federal 
district court after it found that the Alabama Department of Public 
Safety engaged in a “blatant and continuous pattern and practice of 
discrimination.”284   
Some economists have attributed the drastic improvement of blacks 
in the labor market in the 1960s and 1970s to a robust regulatory 
enforcement mechanism that prohibited discrimination and required 
affirmative action.285  Specific studies of the federal mandate on 
affirmative action concluded that the program worked to increase 
black and female employment in contracting firms.286  A 
comprehensive study of 100,000 large private-sector firms across all 
industries and regions from 1973 to 2003 concluded that blacks were 
among the main beneficiaries of federally mandated affirmative 
action programs.287  Specifically, in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
blacks saw the fastest growth in employment shares with federal 
contractors relative to noncontracting firms.288  Interestingly, white 
men also benefitted from the affirmative action mandate with an 
increase in representation in federal contracting firms in managerial 
positions.289  Federal contractors continue to diversify their 
281. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 737 (1st Cir. 1972).
282. Paganucci v. City of New York, 785 F. Supp. 467, 477–78 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d,
993 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1993).
283. Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d 1000, 1008, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989).
284. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 154 (1987) (plurality opinion).
285. See, e.g., BOUND & FREEMAN, supra note 27, at 32; FREEMAN, supra note 27, at 247,
254, 269; Withers & Winston, supra note 29, at 208.
286. See Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action on Employment, 2 J. LAB. 
ECON. 439, 440 (1984); see also Withers & Winston, supra note 29, at 208
(discussing Leonard’s study and a report by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance concluding the effectiveness of the federal affirmative action mandate).
287. See Fidan Ana Kurtulus, The Impact of Affirmative Action on the Employment of
Minorities and Women: A Longitudinal Analysis Using Three Decades of EEO-1
Filings, 35 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 34, 40, 48 (2016).
288. See id. at 48–50.
289. See id. at 49.
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workforces even after their federal contracts have ended.290  The 
study concluded that affirmative action mandates on federal 
contractors substantially contributed to diversifying the workforce.291 
B. The Assault on Affirmative Action
Many who thought that the civil rights movement was steamrolling
too fast overwhelmingly supported the dog whistle politics of Ronald 
Reagan.292  Of those who believed that government should not make 
special efforts to help blacks, 71% voted for Reagan.293  Reagan 
explicitly opposed racial quotas.294  He popularized the notion that 
any attempt to provide preferential treatment was a form of reverse 
discrimination against whites.295  Ascending to the presidency, he 
immediately began an assault on the federal government’s civil rights 
infrastructure.296   
Reagan’s Justice Department worked tirelessly to oppose and 
dismantle affirmative action programs in the public sector and as a 
court-ordered remedy.297  The Department, in Reagan’s first term, 
undertook a review of all public employer cases and sought 
modifications of consent decrees to ensure relief was only provided 
to proven victims of discrimination.298  The Department disavowed 
the use of quotas or other statistical numerical formulas as a remedy 
for systemic discrimination.299  It also sought to reopen cases it had 
290. See id. at 55 tbl.6, 56.
291. Id. at 64.
292. See Jack White, Lott, Reagan and Republican Racism, TIME (Dec. 14, 2002), http://
content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,399921,00.html; Crenshaw, supra note
10, at 1376.
293. Ian Haney-Lopez, The Racism at the Heart of the Reagan Presidency, SALON (Jan.
11, 2014, 7:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2014/01/11/the_racism_at_the_heart_of_
the_reagan_presidency/.
294. President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Civil Rights (June 15,
1985), in THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/2603
75.
295. See id.
296. See Howell Raines, Reagan Dismisses Civil Rights Chief, Busing Supporter, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 17, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/17/us/reagan-dismisses-
civil-rights-chief-busing-supporter.html.
297. See Bartholet, supra note 28, at 39–40.
298. See id. at 40.
299. Withers & Winston, supra note 29, at 196.  In the 1970s, the Justice Department
vigorously litigated and supported as amicus the use of numerical goals and
timetables to rectify discrimination.  Id. at 195.
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settled to undo the affirmative action remedies.300  The assistant 
attorney general of the civil rights division sent letters to all federal 
agencies to discourage compliance with affirmative action mandates 
for federal agencies.301  In 1987, the Reagan Administration 
eliminated the numerical goal requirement for federal agencies and 
instructed them to devise flexible approaches to increasing 
representation of women and nonwhites in their workforces.302  After 
the Reagan assault, the rate of blacks in the federal workforce 
remained stagnant between 1997 and 2006.303 
Similarly, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs 
(OFCCP), which enforces the equal opportunity mandates of federal 
contractors also deemphasized enforcement during the Reagan 
Administration.304  OFCCP, twice without an agency director during 
the Administration, focused on voluntary compliance rather than 
vigorous enforcement.305  Referrals to the Solicitor of Labor for 
enforcement declined from 269 cases in 1980 to 22 cases in 1986.306 
A “report by the Inspector General of the Department of Labor, in 
September 1988, concluded that the OFCCP failed to target for 
investigation contractors who had the highest likelihood of 
noncompliance and rarely evaluated contractors who did not comply 
with federal reporting requirements.”307  In fact, the agency adopted 
new regulations that would have exempted 75% of federal 
contractors from adopting affirmative action plans.308 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, under Clarence 
Thomas’ leadership, also gutted enforcement.309  From 1981 to 1982, 
there was a 70% decline in the number of cases it filed.310  By 1985, 
the agency had all but abandoned systemic litigation on race and sex 
based discrimination against private employers and slashed its 
300. Id. at 196.  In United States v. Paradise, the government switched sides to oppose the
affirmative action consent decree and appealed arguing that it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.  United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987).
301. Withers & Winston, supra note 29, at 199.
302. See 19 EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, DIG. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY LAW 1 
(2008), https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/digest/xix-1.cfm.
303. See id.
304. See Withers & Winston, supra note 29, at 208.
305. See id. at 208–09.
306. Id. at 210.
307. Id. at 18.
308. Id. at 208.
309. See id. at 183.
310. Id. at 14.
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amicus brief filings.311  The amicus briefs the agency filed were often 
for the employer, rather than the employee.312  In addition, the EEOC 
doubled its determination of “no cause” findings (a finding that a 
complaint has no merit), from less than 30% in 1980 to almost 60% 
in 1987.313  
Finally, the Reagan Administration attempted through an executive 
order to essentially remove the affirmative action requirement for 
federal contractors and to thwart voluntary efforts to adopt goals and 
timetables to improve employment opportunities of women and 
nonwhites.314  This effort was ultimately derailed by a coalition of 
business groups, civil rights organizations and Democratic and 
Republican members of Congress.315   
Business leaders substantially opposed Reagan’s assault on 
affirmative action programs, yet at the same time, retooled and 
rebranded EEO policies as diversity management.316  Human 
resource departments began touting diversity programs as a substitute 
for affirmative action.317  Diversity was a bigger tent that brought 
people with varied skills and backgrounds together to increase 
business advantage.318  Yet, diversity was a broad umbrella without a 
specific racial or gender lens and did little to increase black 
representation in the workplace.319  In an empirical study of diversity 
policies covering the past forty years, the authors concluded that 
while businesses engage in many different types of diversity policies 
and strategies, most popular practices are largely ineffective, 
especially for blacks.320  
311. Id.
312. David B. Oppenheimer et al., Be Careful What You Wish for: Ronald Reagan, Donald
Trump, the Assault on Civil Rights, and the Surprising Story of How Title VII Got Its
Private Right of Action, 39 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 143, 147 (2019).
313. Withers & Winston, supra note 29, at 16.
314. Id. at 209.
315. Id.
316. STAINBACK & TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 7, at 155; Dobbin & Sutton, supra
note 30, at 455.
317. Dobbin & Sutton, supra note 30, at 456.
318. Id.
319. See David B. Oppenheimer, The Disappearance of Voluntary Affirmative Action from
the U.S. Workplace, 10 J. POVERTY & SOC. JUST. 1, 9–10 (2016).
320. Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses?  Assessing the Efficacy of
Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 610
(2006); see also Tessa L. Dover, Brenda Major & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Diversity Policies
Rarely Make Companies Fairer, and They Feel Threatening to White Men, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Jan. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/01/diversity-policies-dont-help-wom
en-or-minorities-and-they-make-white-men-feel-threatened.
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With affirmative action effectively hobbled, litigating 
nondiscrimination claims became the narrow vehicle to ensuring 
equal opportunity.321  The subtle and diffused nature of 
discrimination can manifest itself in decisions or conditions that 
produce unequal outcomes even while adhering to formal equality of 
treatment.322  It can encompass decisions or conditions that are 
formally fair but favor a dominant group.323  It can also mask implicit 
stereotyping, race and gender policing and maintaining race/gender 
hierarchies.324  Substantial legal scholarship has been devoted to 
reframing Title VII legal theories to reach these issues.325  But, very 
few practitioners and courts have embraced such reframing.326  
Furthermore, employment discrimination litigation is substantially 
controlled by employers and helps to “legitimate growing substantive 
inequality in American society.”327  It is not surprising that in a 
survey of workers about their views on discrimination, only 3% of 
survey respondents sued for discrimination, even though 28% of 
black respondents, 22% of Hispanic respondents and 6% of white 
respondents said they had experienced unfair treatment.328     
The triumph of equal opportunity over equality of outcomes has 
had devastating effects on the quest for equality.  Racial progress has 
all but stalled after Reagan.  While targeted outreach to minority 
candidates,329 investment in the pipeline in certain industries to 
increase diverse candidates,330 and mentoring programs331 are part of 
the affirmative action infrastructure, they have not had the impact 
that affirmative preferential goals and timetables have had in 
increasing opportunity for blacks.  Race-based hiring and promotion 
321. See BERREY ET AL., supra note 126, at 9–10, 35–38; see also Dobbin & Sutton, supra
note 30, at 446–48.
322. Sturm, supra note 253, at 468–69, 471.
323. Id. at 473–74.
324. See id. at 474.
325. Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 927–37 (2016) (surveying the scholarship proposing
different methodologies for Title VII litigation).
326. Id. at 921–22.
327. BERREY ET AL., supra note 126, at 11, 280.
328. DIXON ET AL., supra note 224, at 11, 15.
329. See Dover et al., infra note 596 and accompanying text.
330. See Renwei Chung, Stop Blaming the Pipeline for the Lack of Diversity in the Legal
Profession and Start Investing in It, ABOVE LAW (May 11, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://
abovethelaw.com/2018/05/stop-blaming-the-pipeline-for-the-lack-of-diversity-in-the-
legal-profession-and-start-investing-in-it/.
331. See Jean E. Girves et al., Mentoring in a Post–Affirmative Action World, 61 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 449, 450–51 (2005).
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decisions need to be re-embraced to eliminate existing discrimination 
in the marketplace, fully integrate the workforce, and close the 
economic divide between whites and blacks. 
IV. THE ENDURING LEGAL VALIDITY OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION
With Justice Kennedy’s retirement, a conservative majority on the 
Supreme Court, the Trump Administration’s rescinding Obama-era 
affirmative action guidelines for educational institutions and recent 
decisions discarding long-standing precedent, it would not be 
preposterous to sound the death knell for affirmative action.332  But it 
would be premature.  Since the late 1970s, the Court has grappled 
with reconciling the pursuit of a colorblind society with the historical 
reality of race-based subjugation.333  The decisions highlight the 
limited understanding that most of the justices have regarding 
discrimination, filtered through a majoritarian lens.  Despite the 
ideological fluctuations of the Court and the fractured nature of most 
affirmative action decisions, the Supreme Court has allowed for 
affirmative action based on race under the Constitution and Title 
VII.334  Today, affirmative action is a constitutionally legal and
statutorily protected remedy, although the Supreme Court has
continuously narrowed the parameters of what is constitutionally
permissible.335  Nonetheless, a close review of the decisions provides
guidance on the contours of a theoretically valid affirmative action
plan.  Amidst the incoherence, the Court has upheld the use of race in
the following instances:
1. Schools and universities can use race as a factor if the
goal is to create diversity;336 
2. Local government can use race as a factor in hiring and
contracting if clear record established a history or ongoing 
practice of discrimination;337 
332. Future of Affirmative Action in Jeopardy with New DOJ Order & Retirement of
Anthony Kennedy, DEMOCRACY NOW (July 6, 2018), https://www.democracynow.org/
2018/7/6/future_of_affirmative_action_in_jeopardy.
333. See infra notes 388–94 and accompanying text.
334. See discussion infra Section IV.A–B.
335. See infra notes 452–55 and accompanying text.
336. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210–11 (2016); Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 314 (2013); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270–
72 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301, 314 (1978) (plurality opinion).
337. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511–12 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277–79, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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3. Federal government can require contractors to adopt
affirmative action plans for hiring and subcontracting, 
subject to some limits;338 
4. Private employers can use race as a factor in designing
voluntary affirmative action programs, subject to certain 
limitations;339 
5. Public employers may take affirmative race-based
actions where there is strong basis in evidence of disparate 
impact liability;340 and 
6. Courts may order race-based affirmative action,
including racial quotas, where discrimination has been 
established.341      
A. The Contours of Race Classifications Under the Fourteenth
Amendment
The Supreme Court’s first affirmative action case on the merits, 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, challenged the 
University of California Davis’ medical school admission policy.342  
The school reserved 16 spots out of 100 for minority applicants.343  
Plaintiff, a white man who was twice rejected from admissions, 
challenged the affirmative action plan as his numerical GPA, test 
scores, and benchmark scores exceeded those of the minority 
admittees.344  A five-justice majority invalidated the quota set 
aside.345  Four of those justices would have done so under Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act, barring recipients of federal funds from 
discriminating, but Justice Powell’s fifth vote was based on a 
violation of Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.346  However, Justice Powell also sided with the 
338. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980) (plurality opinion).
339. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 635 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 (1979).
340. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586–87 (2009) (holding that remedial actions to
avoid disparate-impact liability under Title VII are permissible only when “a strong
basis in evidence” exists that the employer would be liable for discriminatory hiring
practices).
341. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion).
342. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269.
343. Id. at 278–79, 289.
344. Id. at 276–77.
345. Id. at 271, 320.
346. Id. at 267.
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remaining four justices to find constitutionally permissible the use of 
race as a factor in admissions criteria to promote diversity.347 
One year later, the Supreme Court took up affirmative action in 
federal contracting.348  Congress had legislated that at least 10% of 
federal funds for local public works projects be used to purchase 
services or supplies from minority business enterprises (MBEs).349  
The requirement could be waived if minority firms were unavailable 
and the agency had to ensure the funds were allocated to MBEs that 
had been disadvantaged by past discrimination.350  The Supreme 
Court, following the lower courts, upheld the program in a 6–3 
plurality opinion by Justice Burger in Fullilove v. Klutznick.351     
In a series of employment cases between 1986 and 1990, the 
Supreme Court flip-flopped on the proper standard of review, 
swaying the results drastically.352  In Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court was faced with the constitutional 
validity of preferential layoffs negotiated by the union and the board 
of education in its collective bargaining agreement (CBA).353  The 
CBA had an exception to seniority-based layoffs where it would 
allow for the retention of less-senior minority teachers to maintain 
racial balance.354  In a 5–4 plurality opinion by Justice Powell, the 
provision was struck down under the strict scrutiny standard.355  The 
lower courts had not applied the strict scrutiny test but instead upheld 
the plan as constitutional based on a “reasonableness” test.356  Rather 
than remanding to the district court to apply the higher standard of 
review, the Court held that the district court had made no findings of 
past discrimination by the school board.357  Furthermore, the Court 
held that the plan was insufficiently narrow because it placed too 
great a burden on particular individuals to achieve racial equality.358  
Nonetheless, the Court recognized that remedying past discrimination 
347. Id. at 225–26.
348. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980) (plurality opinion).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 448.
351. Id. at 448, 451.
352. See infra notes 353–68 and accompanying text.
353. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 267, 269–70 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
354. Id. at 270.
355. Id. at 268, 273–74.
356. Id. at 272–73, 279.
357. Id. at 277–78.
358. Id. at 283–84.
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was a compelling state interest and race-based remedies were 
constitutionally permissible.359 
With Justice O’Connor at the helm, the Supreme Court issued a 6–
3 majority opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., striking 
down a set-aside program for minority business enterprises (MBE) in 
city contracting.360  The program was modeled after the federal 
program upheld in Fullilove, but required 30% MBE participation in 
subcontracts on city projects.361  Applying strict scrutiny proved fatal 
to the city ordinance.362  The majority found that the city had not 
made adequate findings of past discrimination and that the remedy 
was not closely tied to any existing discrimination.363  Four of the 
justices, including Justice O’Connor, believed that the Fullilove plan 
was distinguishable because it was adopted by Congress, which had 
explicit authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to craft race-conscious remedies.364   
Within the year, the Supreme Court again abandoned strict scrutiny 
in reviewing the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) 
minority preference policy.365  In a 5–4 decision by Justice Brennan 
under the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Metro 
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC upheld the FCC’s policy to give preference 
to minority ownership bids for new radio or television broadcasting 
licenses and permitting “distress sales” to minority owned businesses 
only.366  The majority treated the FCC plan as having been adopted 
by Congress.367  Giving deference to Congress’ institutional 
competence and the powers granted under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the majority found a sufficient nexus 
between the substantial government interest in promoting broadcast 
diversity and in the minority preference policy.368     
359. Id. at 280.
360. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510–11 (1989).
361. Id. at 477–78.
362. Id. at 500–01.
363. Id. at 500–02.
364. Id. at 490–91.  Another factor that contributed to the Justices’s lack of deference to
the city council was the majority status of blacks both in the City of Richmond and on
the city council.  Id. at 496.  Clearly, the Justices were uncomfortable with the idea of
a majority imposing a carve-out that benefitted the majority.  See id.
365. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990).
366. Id. at 577, 600–01.
367. Id. at 563.
368. Id. at 567–69.
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The Supreme Court overturned Metro Broadcasting, Inc. five years 
later in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.369  In a 5–4 majority 
opinion, Justice O’Connor firmly articulated a strict scrutiny standard 
for all government classifications, eschewing a lesser standard for 
Congressional action or benign classifications, ignoring her own 
rationale in earlier opinions about Congress’ special powers under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.370  Disingenuously framing Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. as a departure from the Court’s earlier decisions 
and overruling it on the standard of review, Justice O’Connor took 
pains to “dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact.’”371  She stated, “The unhappy persistence of both the 
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against 
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and 
government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.”372  The 
case was remanded to determine the validity of the federal 
Department of Transportation providing financial incentives to prime 
contractors to hire small businesses controlled by socially and 
economically disadvantaged individuals.373  
More recently, the Supreme Court narrowly approved race-based 
affirmative action programs in higher education for the limited 
purpose of diversity.374  In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court in a 5–4 
decision held that race can be a factor in admissions decisions at the 
University of Michigan law school.375  On the same day, the Court in 
a 6–3 decision in Gratz v. Bollinger struck down the use of race in 
undergraduate admissions at the same university because it was not 
narrowly tailored.376  The majority found the automatic awarding of 
twenty points (one-fifth of the points needed for admission) to every 
minority applicant removed individualized consideration and made 
race decisive for these applicants.377  Thus, the admissions policy was 
not narrowly tailored.378  Finally, in reviewing the undergraduate 
admissions policy at the University of Texas, the Supreme Court 
369. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226–27 (1995).
370. Id. at 236.
371. Id. at 237.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 239.
374. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003).
375. Id.
376. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270–72 (2003).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 275.
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reaffirmed the strict scrutiny standard and the diversity rationale, and 
upheld the policy as narrowly tailored.379   
A close review of these cases illuminates a narrow and winding 
path to justifying the use of race-based affirmative action by the 
government.380  
1. Race Classification Constitutionally Permissible
It is important to recognize at the outset that the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause does allow for race-
classification.  The Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged 
that race-classification by the government is permissible under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.381   
The Fourteenth Amendment does not espouse color-neutrality but 
prohibits hatred and subordination based on race.382  The majority of 
Republicans who framed and ratified the Equal Protection Clause 
intended the clause to make unconstitutional state actions that singled 
out blacks in order to disadvantage them.383  They sought to “bridg[e] 
the vast distance between members of the Negro race and the white 
‘majority.’”384  Blacks were recognized as needing additional 
protection to rectify centuries of unequal and subordinate 
treatment.385  Justice Harlan recognized this in his dissent in Plessy: 
Sixty millions of whites are in no danger from the presence 
here of eight millions of blacks. The destinies of the two 
races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and 
the interests of both require that the common government of 
379. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210–11 (2016); see also
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 314 (2013).
380. See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210–11; Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 314; Gratz, 539 U.S.
at 270–72; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 226–27 (1995); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990).
381. See, e.g., Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 310; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280–81, 306, 313 (1986) (plurality opinion); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482–84, 517–19, 548 (1980) (plurality opinion); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325–26 (1978) (plurality opinion).
382. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Melissa L.
Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV.
245, 269–70 (1997).
383. Saunders, supra note 382, at 292–93.
384. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872))
(plurality opinion).
385. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
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all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under 
the sanction of law.386 
Legal scholars along with lay observers on both sides of the 
political spectrum argue that the Civil Rights Amendments wiped 
away the original sin of a color-stratified Constitution and that our 
best intentions are to live in a society where race does not matter.387  
This color-blind narrative frames the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
universal equality doctrine.388  Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson is often quoted to support this notion,389 but his dissent 
cannot be unhinged from the reality of its time.390  The crux of Plessy 
is the fight over integration, not equality.391  Justice Harlan’s dissent 
describes the problem for which he prescribes a color-blind 
approach: 
What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more 
certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between 
these races, than state enactments which, in fact, proceed on 
the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded 
that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied 
by white citizens? 392 
Justice Brennan in Bakke urged that the Constitution and Title VII 
not be used to “let color blindness become myopia which masks the 
reality that many ‘created equal’ have been treated within our 
lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens.”393  
By not outright prohibiting the use of race-conscious classifications 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court tacitly 
endorsed this purpose.394   
386. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
387. See Cedric M. Powell, Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second
Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191, 231 (1997);
Dennis Parker, The 14th Amendment Was Intended to Achieve Racial Justice – And
We Must Keep It That Way, ACLU (July 9, 2018, 5:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/racial-justice/race-and-inequality-education/14th-amendment-was-intended-
achieve-racial-justice.
388. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
389. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
390. See id. at 552–64.
391. Id. at 560.
392. Id.
393. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
394. Id. at 320 (plurality opinion).
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2. All Race Classifications Subject to Strict Scrutiny
As discussed above, the Supreme Court grappled for decades on
the proper standard of review to apply to race-based classifications.  
The debate centered on whether different standards of review should 
apply to classifications that are benign, or burdensome, to a “discrete 
and insular minority.”395   
The Supreme Court began its affirmative action jurisprudence by 
calling for strict scrutiny standard in the plurality opinion in Bakke.396  
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, explained that when 
government decisions “touch upon an individual's race or ethnic 
background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden 
he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.”397  He rejected the notion of 
benign race classifications, even though all of the cases he relied on 
dealt with burdening a “discrete and insular minority.”398  
Nonetheless, the plurality concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment 
afforded the white majority the same level of protection.399   For 
support, Justice Powell relied on McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transportation Co., a case under Title VII and Section 1981 of the 
Civil Rights Act.400  But, the case dealt with whether these two 
statutory provisions banned discrimination against whites, not the 
proper constitutional standard of review.401   
Nonetheless, Justice Powell used the case to justify the same 
standard of review for whether a law or policy burdens the majority 
white population or the minority.402  Bakke, however, did not dispose 
395. Id. at 287–88 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)) (plurality opinion).
396. Id. at 291.
397. Id. at 299.
398. Id. at 290–93 (quoting Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
399. Id. at 292–93.
400. Id. at 293; see also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 
(1976). 
401. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 296.
402. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293.  Even a cursory examination of the burdens lays bare that it is
not the same burden placed on the majority, and the underlying facts in Ricci v.
DeStefano illustrate the point.  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 566, 590 (2009).
On a promotion exam for the rank of lieutenant or captain, the examination yielded a
list with only white applicants at the top.  Id. at 566.  Attempts by the city council to
change the makeup of the list would have allowed for four blacks to be considered as
opposed to zero.  Id. at 590.  However, the Court said that the remedy was not
available to the city because it would be discriminatory under Title VII.  Id.  The
remedy would have disadvantaged only four white individuals compared to the
burden on blacks, which was a complete exclusion.  Id.
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of the standard of review question.403  There was at least an 
alignment of five justices over the next decade to advocate for a less 
stringent review when the classification benefitted minority 
groups.404  In Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan went further and 
advocated different levels of review based on whether Congress or 
state and local governments adopted the race-conscious 
classifications.405   
As the makeup of the Court changed, the strict scrutiny standard 
had majority support.406  Since 1995, the Supreme Court has 
consistently required strict scrutiny for all racial classifications.407  
Under strict scrutiny, the use of race must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve the state’s compelling objective.408  
3. Substantial State Interest Limited to Diversity and Remedying
Past Discrimination
When the state uses race to distribute benefits or impose burdens, 
the state must demonstrate that the challenged race classification is 
narrowly tailored to promote a substantial state interest.409  The 
Supreme Court has narrowly defined the state’s interest in adopting 
race classifications.410   
i. Education
In the educational context, the Supreme Court has approved of only
one justification for adopting race-based affirmative action plans: 
diversity of the student body.411  Institutions of higher learning seek 
to foster academic freedom, a right encompassed under the First 
Amendment.412  The Supreme Court has deferred to the stated 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body, 
specifically enhanced classroom dialogue, destruction of stereotypes, 
reduction of racial isolation, promotion of cross-racial understanding, 
403. See Metro Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563–65 (1990); see also Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491–92 (1980) (plurality opinion).
404. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491–92; see also Metro Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 565.
405. Metro Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 565–66.
406. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
407. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 270 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand, 515
U.S. at 236.
408. Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 306–07; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
409. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (plurality opinion).
410. Id.
411. Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 314–15.
412. Id. at 308; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (plurality opinion).
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preparation for a diverse workforce and society, and cultivation of a 
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.413  The 
institution’s judgment that such diversity is essential to its 
educational mission has not been second-guessed by the Court on 
First Amendment grounds.414  The business of an educational 
institution is to create an “atmosphere which is most conducive to 
speculation, experiment, and creation” and hinges on who should be 
admitted to study.415  Thus, a diverse student body is a 
constitutionally permissible goal, because it is at the heart of the 
school’s institutional mission.416 
The Court has embraced a much broader definition of diversity.417  
Thus, race and ethnic origin is a “single though important element” 
among a host of qualifications and characteristics that make an 
individual diverse.418  Race cannot be the defining feature in the 
evaluation of the candidate.419 
The Supreme Court has shown no deference to the other stated goal 
of race-based admissions plans: remedying past discrimination.420  
Instead, the Court has placed a heavy burden on justifying race-based 
affirmative action plans in education to remedy past 
discrimination.421  The Supreme Court found educational institutions 
incapable of making a finding of constitutional or statutory 
violations.422  Without a finding by a judicial, legislative, or 
administrative body of past discrimination at this particular 
institution, remedying the effects of past discrimination is not a 
substantiated interest.423   
To be narrowly tailored, the Court has outright rejected a quota 
system, like the one in Bakke.424  The idea of racial balancing is 
odious at least to the current majority on the Supreme Court.425   
Recently, in Grutter, the Court provided a road map to creating a 
413. Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 308; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
414. Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 308; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
415. Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 308 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
416. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12.
417. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
418. Id. at 315.
419. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336–37.
420. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
421. Id. at 307–09.
422. Id. at 309–10.
423. Id. at 307–10.
424. See id. at 289.
425. See id.; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003).
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narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions plan: no quotas; must be 
sufficiently flexible, limited in time, and adopted after “serious, good 
faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.”426 
ii. Employment
The state’s interest in race-based affirmative action plans in the
employment context has been given wider breadth.  Unlike in the 
educational arena, the Supreme Court has held “beyond dispute” that 
public entities have a compelling interest in remedying past 
discrimination and to ensure that it not serve to “finance the evil of 
private prejudice.”427  Through its Spending Powers and Commerce 
Clause, the Court has validated Congress’ conditioning of federal 
funds to achieve congressional objectives.428  Congress does not have 
to act in a “wholly ‘color-blind’ fashion.”429  Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is a “positive grant of legislative power” 
given to Congress to determine what legislation is needed to secure 
the guarantees of the Amendment.430    
Congress can fashion race-based plans without compiling the same 
record as in a judicial or adjudicatory proceeding.431  While the Court 
has required a more stringent evidentiary showing to justify such 
plans, it has not curtailed the exercise of congressional power to 
effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment.432  However, a generalized 
assertion of past discrimination is insufficient.433 
In Fullilove, Congress made several findings to support the 10% 
allotment for MBEs: 1) long history of disparity of minority business 
participation in the construction industry; 2) even in the absence of 
intentional discrimination, there was direct evidence that the pattern 
of disadvantage and discrimination existed at state and local 
construction contracting; and 3) the problem was national in scope.434  
Congress determined that a limited racial and ethnic preference was 
necessary to remedy past discrimination and crafted a narrowly 
tailored remedy that specified the “minimum level of minority 
business participation; the identification of the minority groups that 
are to be encompassed by the program; and the provision for an 
426. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 339, 342.
427. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989).
428. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474–75 (1980) (plurality opinion).
429. Id. at 482.
430. Id. at 476.
431. Id. at 478.
432. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
433. Id. at 498.
434. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477–78.
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administrative waiver where application of the program was not 
feasible.”435  The Supreme Court, while not settling on a standard of 
review, concluded in plurality opinions that the set- aside would 
survive intermediate or strict scrutiny.436 
The Court imposed a more exacting standard on the City of 
Richmond in Croson, finding that it must make something akin to a 
prima facie finding of systemic discrimination before it can act.437  
Justice O’Connor spent a lengthy paragraph affirming the city’s 
ability to eradicate the effects of private discrimination if the city had 
become a “passive participant” in a racial exclusionary system 
practiced by private actors.438  Yet, she found the history of both 
private and public discrimination contributing to lack of opportunities 
for blacks as insufficient evidence to support a race-based remedy.439  
The dissent, however, highlighted a compelling record of 
discrimination in the City.440  Only 0.67% of prime contracts went to 
minority businesses.441  The major construction trade associations in 
Richmond had virtually no minority members.442  The Council also 
heard testimony about exclusionary history of the construction trade 
in the City, as well as findings by Congress of widespread 
discrimination nationally in the industry.443  
The City compared this to the general population of minorities in 
the city to determine that there was a statistical disparity.444  The 
majority rejected the City’s analysis because the comparison was not 
to the total pool of qualified minority businesses in the city.445  But, 
Justice O’Connor herself acknowledged that where past 
discrimination has resulted in exclusion of minorities from a 
particular industry, the proper comparator can be to the total 
percentage of minorities in the labor force.446  As the dissent points 
out, if the government channels almost all its contracting funds to a 
white-dominated contracting community that is the product of past 
exclusionary systems, then the city has provided a “measurable 
435. Id. at 468.
436. See id. at 492, 515, 521.
437. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499–500.
438. Id. at 492.
439. See id. at 499.
440. See id. at 531–35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
441. Id. at 534.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 501 (majority opinion).
445. See id. at 501–02.
446. See id. at 501; see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 651 (1987).
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boost” to those entities who were allowed to participate in that 
community because of race.447     
Rather than remanding the case to allow the parties to bolster the 
record with the proper comparator,448 the majority invalidated the 
30% set-aside, finding that there were other race-neutral means to 
increase MBE participation, such as simplifying the bidding 
process.449  In Croson, the Court may have reached a different result 
had Congress enacted the set-aside, rather than the city council.450    
After Croson, public employers needed to demonstrate that the 
relevant government unit had a “strong” basis in evidence that actual 
discrimination had occurred before adopting affirmative action 
plans.451  
4. Burden Must Be Narrowly Tailored
The means chosen to accomplish the state’s interest must be
narrowly tailored and must be necessary to achieve the state’s 
interest.452  Thus, there must be a nexus between the racial-
classification and the compelling state interest.453  The Supreme 
Court provides no deference to the government in the means chosen 
to implement its compelling objective.454  However, the government 
does not need to exhaust all race-neutral alternatives, but must 
demonstrate “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternative.”455 
In some cases, the Supreme Court in evaluating this criteria 
focused heavily on the burdens placed on “innocent parties,” while 
ignoring that the Fourteenth Amendment does permit burdening 
some individuals more than others to effectuate the purpose of the 
447. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 538 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
448. The city did engage in sloppy legislating by not gathering the relevant data of the
number of MBEs in the relevant market area that could qualify for prime or
subcontracting work in public construction projects.  See id. at 502–03 (majority
opinion).
449. Id. at 509–10.
450. Fullilove is not dispositive here as this is not a case of congressional power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 504–05.
451. Id. at 500.
452. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980) (plurality opinion).
453. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (holding that the remedy was not tied to any injury
because there was no record of prior discrimination).
454. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 310–11 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
455. Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 312 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
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equal protection clause.456  The inquiry should be whether the 
“sharing of the burden” is unduly burdensome.457  
The Supreme Court in the employment arena has indicated its 
approval of quotas under certain circumstances.458  In Fullilove, the 
court looked to the overall construction opportunities for whites and 
found that the burden of the program was relatively light and upheld 
the 10% set-aside.459  In the City of Richmond, the Court had 
problems with the City’s compelling reason, not the use of quotas.460  
The Court said that “generalized assertions” were not enough to 
justify “rigid” racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts.461  
In Wygant, three of the justices saw the layoffs as simply too heavy a 
burden to be imposed on “innocent parties.”462  At the same time, 
Justice Powell indicated that hiring goals would have been more 
appropriate to meet the state’s compelling interest because it places a 
more diffused burden.463  Justice Powell said “[d]enial of a future 
employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing 
job.”464 
Since these employment cases have been decided, the Supreme 
Court has further developed its narrowness jurisprudence in the 
educational context.465  The Court, in recent cases, has been more 
exacting on narrowness and the burden it places on “innocent 
parties.”466  The decisions require that individualized considerations 
must be part of the admissions decision-making (as opposed to 
mechanical or reserving of seats) and that race must be a plus factor 
and not the decisive factor in decision-making.467  Where whites 
would be rejected outright because of quotas or rigid numerical spots 
that were reserved exclusively for nonwhites, the Supreme Court 
emphatically rejected it as unconstitutional racial balancing in 
456. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 281–82; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484.
457. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777
(1976)); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
458. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454, 491–92.
459. Id. at 484 (plurality opinion).
460. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
461. Id.
462. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281–84 (1986) (plurality opinion).
463. Id. at 282–83.
464. Id.
465. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270–73 (2003).
466. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307, 317 (1978) (plurality
opinion); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003); see also Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 311 (2013).
467. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270–74.
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educational cases.468  Goals which require good-faith effort to come 
within a range and permit each candidate to compete with all others, 
with race being a “plus” factor, are permissible.469  The key is the 
flexible use of race to achieve a critical mass of underrepresented 
minorities, without exclusively rejecting whites on the basis of 
race.470  It is likely that the Supreme Court would extend this analysis 
to the employment context as well.471 
B. Not Prohibited by Title VII
During the Title VII debates, the plight of blacks in the economy
was at the forefront of Congressional leaders’ concern in prohibiting 
racial discrimination in private employment.472  Similar to today, 
blacks were largely relegated to unskilled and semi-skilled jobs.473  
As automation reduced these jobs, black unemployment 
skyrocketed.474  Congress acknowledged the worsening condition of 
blacks.475  “In 1947 the nonwhite unemployment rate was only 64 
percent higher than the white rate; in 1962 it was 124 percent 
higher.”476  As one senator urged, “This is a social malaise and a 
social situation which we should not tolerate. That is one of the 
principal reasons why the bill should pass.”477  The goal of the Civil 
Rights Act was to integrate blacks into the mainstream of American 
society, a goal that could not be achieved without the ability of 
blacks to “secure ‘jobs which have a future.’”478 
Yet, there existed a tension in the egalitarian purpose of the Act 
and the need to secure the votes from those who traditionally resisted 
federal regulation of private business.479  While Congress debated the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, the New York Human Rights Commission 
468. See Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 311, 314; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307,
317.
469. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–37.
470. See id.; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317–19.
471. See supra Section IV.A.3.ii.
472. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); see also United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (noting Congress’s rationale
for Title VII through the usage of various senators’s statements).
473. See 110 CONG. REC. 6547 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); Quillian et al., supra
note 11.
474. See 110 CONG. REC. at 6547–48 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
475. See id.
476. Id. at 6547; Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (citation omitted).
477. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7220 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Clark)).
478. Id. at 202–03 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7204 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark)).
479. See 110 CONG. REC. 7204, 7208–09 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark).
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and the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission issued 
decisions interpreting its state anti-discrimination laws to support a 
disparate impact theory of discrimination.480  Some Congressional 
members were nervous about whether disparate impact liability 
called for the adoption of racial quotas.481   
Section 703(j) was a compromise to allay these fears.  The section 
stated that Title VII shall not be interpreted to  
require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to 
any individual or to any group because of the race . . . of 
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which 
may exist with respect to the total number of percentage of 
persons of any race . . . employed by any employer . . . in 
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons 
of such race . . . in any community, State . . . or in the 
available work force in any community . . . .482 
The section notably did not prohibit voluntary affirmative efforts to 
correct racial imbalance.483     
In 1979, the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America, 
AFL-CIO v. Weber, explicitly recognized that “Congress did not 
intend to limit traditional business freedom to such degree as to 
prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action.”484  In 
Weber, the company and the union implemented a voluntary 
affirmative action plan with hiring goals to increase the number of 
blacks in skilled craft positions for each plant equal to the percentage 
of blacks in the respective local labor force.485  To meet these goals, 
the company and union established on-the job training programs.486  
Half of the training slots were reserved for blacks.487  The Court, in a 
5–2 majority opinion by Justice Brennan, upheld the plan as 
permissible under Title VII.488  The Court concluded that the plain 
480. Oppenheimer, supra note 319, at 40.
481. Id.
482. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2012).
483. Weber, 443 U.S. at 204 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–
18 (1975)).
484. Id. at 207.
485. Id. at 198.
486. Id. at 197.
487. Id. at 198.
488. Id. at 209.
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statutory language of Section 703(j) did not mandate affirmative 
action but it also did not prohibit it.489   
The Court delineated the criteria for a bona fide affirmative action 
plan: 
1) the purpose of the plan is to “break down old patterns
of racial segregation and hierarchy” and open employment 
opportunities that were traditionally closed to them; 
2) the plan must not “unnecessarily trammel the interests
of [the] white employees” (e.g. requiring that they be 
discharged and replaced with black employees);  
3) the plan must not create an absolute bar to the
advancement of white employees; and 
4) the plan must be temporary and intended not to
maintain a racial balance but to eliminate a manifest racial 
imbalance.490 
The affirmative action plan in Weber centered on temporary 
training programs which opened up opportunities for skilled craft 
work to both blacks and whites.491  It did not foreclose opportunities 
for whites.492  Furthermore, the employer does not need to show its 
own past discriminatory behavior or even an “arguable violation” to 
adopt a plan.493  Statistical disparity would be sufficient to justify a 
voluntary affirmative action plan.494 
In 1987, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to revisit its 
decision in Weber when it reviewed an affirmative action plan giving 
preferential treatment to women.495   In Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, Santa Clara County, California, the agency adopted an 
affirmative action plan, which among other things, considered the sex 
of an applicant as one factor in deciding promotion to positions that 
were traditionally segregated.496  The long-term goal of the 
affirmative action plan was to achieve proportional representation of 
489. Id. at 205–06, 208.
490. Id. at 207–08.
491. Id. at 198.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
494. Id.
495. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 635 (1987).  While the plan was adopted
by a public employer, no constitutional challenge was brought to the plan, and the
Court decided the case solely under Title VII.  Id. at 620 n.2.
496. Id. at 621–22.
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minorities and women.497 The Court reaffirmed its rationale in 
Weber.498   It reiterated that statistical imbalance and not a prima 
facie case of discrimination was sufficient to justify a voluntary 
affirmative action plan.499 In addition, sex is but one among 
numerous factors that must be considered in making the promotion 
decision.500 
Weber and Johnson continue to be valid and provide guidance to 
private employers and unions to voluntarily adopt affirmative action 
plans.501  Whether statistical comparison to the general labor pool let 
alone mere statistical disparity is still a valid yardstick is questionable 
but the underlying rationale and analysis of these cases under Title 
VII remain sound.502   
Ricci v. DeStefano, while not an affirmative action case and 
involved a public employer, may have inadvertently strengthened the 
rationale of Weber and Johnson and provides yet another means to 
adopt voluntary affirmative action plans.503  In Ricci, the City of New 
Haven, Connecticut, did not certify the results of two test results for 
promotion to the Lieutenant and Captain ranks in the New Haven fire 
department.504  The City argued that had it certified the exams, it 
would have had a disparate impact on minority firefighters.505  The 
top candidates eligible for immediate promotion to Lieutenant were 
all white, and for the Captain rank, seven were white and two were 
Hispanic.506  The City was sued by those eligible for promotion 
arguing disparate treatment under Title VII.507  The Supreme Court 
held that the City had not demonstrated a “strong basis in evidence” 
that had it not discarded the tests, it would have been liable under 
disparate impact under Title VII.508  The City did meet the prima 
facie case of disparate impact liability but the City had not 
considered whether the tests were not job related and consistent with 
business necessity or whether equally valid less-discriminatory 
497. Id. at 621.
498. See id. at 635.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 637.
501. See infra notes 600–17 and accompanying text.
502. Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci’s Dicta: Signaling a New Standard for Affirmative Action
Under Title VII?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 241, 257–58 (2011).
503. See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
504. See id.
505. Id. at 562.
506. Id. at 566.
507. Id. at 563.
508. Id.
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alternatives existed.509  While the City ultimately lost, the case 
reaffirmed some core principles under Title VII.510 
First, the majority rejected outright that an employer under Title 
VII is forbidden under any circumstances from making race-based 
decisions.511  Second, Congress intended that “voluntary compliance” 
be the preferred means to achieve the objectives of Title VII and 
thus, a strong basis in evidence is not akin to actual proof of a 
disparate impact violation.512  Such a standard would chill all 
voluntary remedial efforts.513  Finally, Ricci explicitly recognized 
that voluntary efforts to address racial segregation is allowed and 
preferred under Title VII.514  Thus, private employers can be far 
bolder in structuring affirmative action plans within the parameters 
outlined by the Court.515   
V. RE-EMBRACING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PRIVATE
EMPLOYMENT
It is this Nation’s “ongoing obligation to engage in constant 
deliberation and continued reflection” to achieve equality.516  In the 
past, robust civil rights enforcement coupled with rising boycotts and 
political pressure from civil rights groups drastically increased the 
price of discrimination.517  New environmental pressures are 
necessary to revamp the efforts to integrate the workforce and to 
increase economic progress among nonwhites.518   
The law on affirmative action in the employment arena is not the 
obstacle that we perceive it to be; in fact, Title VII provides far 
509. Id. at 587–88; Corrada, supra note 502, at 254 (explaining the City had met the
traditional disparate impact test, where the pass rate for one group of test takers is less
than 80% of the pass rate for the highest passing group).
510. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593.
511. Id. at 579.
512. Id. at 580–81.
513. Corrada, supra note 502, at 259.  While private employers are not bound by the strict
scrutiny strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment, Ricci imported the “strong basis in
evidence” from the Equal Protection cases to a Title VII challenge.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at
582.
514. Id.
515. See supra notes 483–510 and accompanying text; see infra note 612 and
accompanying text.
516. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016).
517. See FREEMAN, supra note 87, at 93–94.
518. Cf. id. (showing that environmental social pressures were the key factor in the
reduction of workforce discrimination in the civil rights era).
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greater leeway for employers to voluntarily adopt affirmative action 
plans, including race-conscious decision-making.519 
In order to reintroduce affirmative action as a viable remedy in 
employment, a new normative shift is needed.  Affirmative action is 
universally described today as a controversial measure, thanks 
largely in part to Reagan’s reframing it as an unfair system to 
innocent whites.520  Once in power, the Democrats, limited by the 
conservative framework, weakly endorsed affirmative action and 
eventually relinquished the idea as a means towards employment 
equality. 521 
To achieve the normative shift requires reframing the public 
discourse through effective communication systems.522  As the 
linguist and cognitive scientist George Lakoff has repeatedly 
stressed, thoughts are physical and all thoughts use conceptual 
frames.523  These frames are “physically instantiated in the synapses 
and neural circuits of our brains” through repetition.524  Frequency of 
language and imagery strengthens the brain circuit and synapses.525  
The constant use of a particular framing has enormous political 
consequences.526  When gay civil rights leaders shifted the framing 
around gay marriage from a “rights” issue to an issue about love and 
commitment, it not only changed public perception but brought about 
a legal revolution.527   
519. Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583 (2009) (noting the legislative intent that
Title VII be voluntarily complied with by employers and discussing the permissibility
of race-based decisions).
520. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
521. See Tricia McTague et al., An Organizational Approach to Understanding Sex and
Race Segregation in U.S. Workplaces, 87 SOC. FORCES 1499, 1517–18 (2009)
(describing how affirmative action weakened during the Reagan and Bush
administration due to shifts in normative messaging, leading to weaker messaging
from the Clinton administration than would have been expected in the pre-Reagan
era).
522. See GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND 
FRAME THE DEBATE 3–4, 100–01 (2004) [hereinafter DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!]
(discussing the principles of idea framing and how to effectively create a frame for
one’s ideas).
523. GEORGE LAKOFF, WHOSE FREEDOM?  THE BATTLE OVER AMERICA’S MOST IMPORTANT
IDEA 10 (2006) [hereinafter WHOSE FREEDOM?] (“‘Frames’ are mental structures of
limited scope with a systematic internal organization”).
524. Id. at 10.
525. Id.
526. See id. at 11–12 (“When you think within a frame, you tend to ignore what is outside
the frame.”).
527. Wofford, supra note 55; see DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!, supra note 522, at 48–
49.
256 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 48 
Reagan’s reframing of affirmative action as “reverse 
discrimination” continues to dominate the public discourse.528  Many 
proponents of affirmative action simply argue against the 
conservative frame, which legitimizes the racial hierarchy and 
stratification embedded into American society.529   
Another frame that has often constricted the public dialogue is the 
concept of fairness and equality.530  Proponents of Proposition 209, a 
1996 ballot initiative in California that amended the California 
Constitution to prohibit public institutions from using affirmative 
action, framed the issue narrowly about fairness in competition, using 
so-called objective means.531  Affirmative action, in this frame, is 
understood as unfair competition.532  But this only makes sense when 
you focus solely on admissions decisions.533  If you broaden the lens 
to include the historical advantage that segregation conferred on 
whites and the existence of current discrimination and bias in 
education, then affirmative action becomes an equalizing force to 
ensure fairness to blacks and other nonwhites.534   
Similarly, equality has been straitjacketed into a narrow frame.535  
Equality of opportunity in public discourse simply means that 
everyone at the starting line has the same chance of winning the 
race.536  However, you cannot take a person who has been denied the 
opportunity to train, denied access to proper shoes and running gear, 
denied expert coaching, and forbidden for centuries from running, 
and believe that you have provided equality of opportunity to 
compete fairly.537      
528. See supra notes 300–01 and accompanying text.
529. See KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 109–13 (detailing how to refute claims of “reverse
discrimination” largely in terms of explaining the concept of discrimination); see
DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!, supra note 522, at 28 (explaining that the main focus
of activists on the left is to try to help people directly, leaving little time for framing
issues through messaging, while on the right activists are focused on messaging and
framing to preserve the dominance of their moral values).
530. See KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 112–13.
531. See WHOSE FREEDOM?, supra note 523, at 54–55.
532. Id. at 55.
533. Id.
534. See JOHN R. THELIN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 231–33, 347–49
(2011); Shaun R. Harper et al., Access and Equity for African American Students in
Higher Education: A Critical Race Historical Analysis of Policy Efforts, 80 J. OF
HIGHER EDUC. 389, 397, 400 (2009); see also JOE R. FEAGIN ET AL., THE AGONY OF
EDUCATION: BLACK STUDENTS AT WHITE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 154–57 (1996).
535. See WHOSE FREEDOM?, supra note 523, at 50.
536. See An Introduction to Equality of Opportunity, STANFORD UNIV., https://edeq.stan
ford.edu/sections/equality-opportunity-introduction (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
537. See id.
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Equality and fairness are useful frames for affirmative action only 
if the frame is broadened to account for both historical and current 
discrimination.538  While the election of the first black president 
made it easier to discount the current effects of slavery and 
segregation, the magnitude of empirical evidence coupled with the 
statistical data on the stratification of the labor market show that 
segregation today is a stark reality in employment.539  With overt 
displays of white supremacy, it is much harder to deny that racism is 
still part of the American fabric.540     
Discrimination, both past and present, imposes on the freedom to 
achieve economic prosperity.541  Historically, a close partnership of 
private and institutional players systematically constructed a 
segregation system that eliminated any competition for good jobs, 
thus ensuring economic prosperity for whites and denying blacks 
jobs.542  Today, implicit bias is having the same effect as “Whites 
Only” job ads of the 1950s, by limiting competition for the benefit of 
whites and to the actual detriment of blacks.543  Discrimination, then, 
is a systemic cause of economic disparity for blacks.544  It also makes 
white prosperity possible.545  Affirmative action, thus, is a necessary 
antidote to discrimination and a countervailing force to the historic 
advantage conferred on whites.546    
Reframing affirmative action needs sustained public discussion and 
investment in effective communication systems.547  Conservatives 
538. See WHOSE FREEDOM?, supra note 523, at 50–55.
539. See supra Section II.B.
540. See, e.g., Joe Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlotte
sville-timeline/.
541. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text.
542. See supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text; see also KATZNELSON, supra note 1,
at 43.
543. See supra Section II.B.2; see also Erik Sherman, Hiring Bias Blacks and Latinos Face
Hasn’t Improved in 25 Years, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2017, 4:30 AM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/eriksherman/2017/09/16/job-discrimination-against-blacks-and-latinos-has-
changed-little-or-none-in-25-years/.
544. See supra Section II.B; see also Michael Hiltzik, Economic Inequality is the Cause
and the Consequence of Our Racial Problems, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2016, 10:55 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-economic-racism-20160711-
snap-story.html.
545. See supra Section II.B; see also DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!, supra note 522, at
167.
546. See id.
547. See supra text accompanying notes 522–27; WHOSE FREEDOM?, supra note 523, at
249.
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invest twice as much money as progressives to develop and reinforce 
their frames through think tanks and training institutes for future 
leaders, as well as the media.548  In November 2008, voters in 
Colorado defeated a ballot initiative to end affirmative action in 
public employment, education and public contracting.549  An analysis 
of what led to the defeat of the proposition found that voter attitudes 
along with sustained media messaging influenced voter behavior.550  
The ballot initiative was poorly worded and confused voters that a 
“Yes” vote was a support for affirmative action.551  In fact, if the 
initiative was clearly worded, then it would have failed by a much 
wider margin: 66 to 34 percent, because Coloradoans 
overwhelmingly supported affirmative action.552  Furthermore, voters 
overwhelmingly relied on print and broadcast news reporting for 
information.553  Perspectives against the ballot initiative were 
published at “nearly double the frequency” as pro-initiative and some 
newspapers published multiple editorial in opposition to the 
initiative.554 
A concerted effort, thus, is necessary by progressives to reframe 
affirmative action and it is doable.555  Progressives have allies and 
systems already in place, but these networks need to be pushed to 
embrace affirmative action in employment as a civil rights priority.556  
A new breed of civil rights activists has emerged that is once again 
making visible the discriminatory treatment of blacks with the help of 
548. ANNE JOHNSON & TOBIN VAN OSTERN, COMPARING CONSERVATIVE AND PROGRESSIVE 
INVESTMENT IN AMERICA’S YOUTH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 2, 4, 12 (Dec. 2012);
DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!, supra note 522, at 16.  The five conservative youth
organizations with the biggest expenditures had a combined budget of $53 million
while the five largest progressive youth organizations had $23 million.  JOHNSON & 
VAN OSTERN, supra, at 12.
549. Naomi Zeveloff, Amendment 46 to Repeal Affirmative Action Loses Despite Hefty
Odds, COLO. INDEP. (Nov. 7, 2008), https://www.coloradoindependent.com/2008/11/
07/amendment-46-to-repeal-affirmative-action-loses-despite-hefty-odds/.  By 2008,
California, Michigan, Washington, and Nebraska, had passed anti-affirmative action
ballot initiatives.  Id.  Since Colorado’s defeat, three other states—Arizona, New
Hampshire, and Oklahoma—have banned affirmative action.  Drew DeSilver,
Supreme Court Says States Can Ban Affirmative Action; 8 Already Have, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/22/supreme-
court-says-states-can-ban-affirmative-action-8-already-have/.
550. MOSES ET AL., supra note 56, at 1–2.
551. Id. at 1.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 2.
554. Id. at 4.
555. DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!, supra note 522, at 109.
556. See infra text accompanying notes 600–19.
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social media; pithy hashtags capture the essence of the movements.557  
#BlackLivesMatter not only condemns police brutality but an entire 
society that does not value black lives.558  #MeToo highlights the 
pervasiveness of sexual assault on women and breaks the silence and 
stigma around speaking out.559   
Similarly, #OccupyWallStreet reframed the debate around 
economic inequality through the “We are the 99%” Tumblr blog.560  
It had a simple call: “Make a sign.  Write your circumstance at the 
top, no longer than a single sentence . . . .  Then, take a picture of 
yourself holding the sign and submit it to us.  The 99 percent have 
been set against each other, fighting over the crumbs the 1 percent 
leaves behind.”561   The blog illustrated that the problems faced by 
individuals were a structural injustice of the economic system rather 
than personal shortcomings.562  
Less ubiquitous is the #equalpay campaign, which seeks to 
eliminate the gender wage gap.563  While the social media footprint is 
not as large as the other campaigns, #equalpay campaign has had 
success in mobilizing some large employers, such as Salesforce, to 
commit to pay transparency and equity.564  
Some of these movements started out on social media without any 
tactical purpose, but have reshaped the American discourse on these 
issues.565  Borrowing from the organizing tactics of these campaigns, 
through social media, old-fashioned protests, and boycotts, 
557. See KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM #BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK
LIBERATION 23–24 (2016); see also Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklives
matter.com/about/herstory/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
558. See TAYLOR, supra note 557, at 12–14; see also What We Believe, BLACK LIVES
MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/what-we-believe/ (last visited Dec. 20,
2018).
559. ME TOO., supra note 51.
560. PAOLO GERBAUDO, TWEETS AND THE STREETS: SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONTEMPORARY 
ACTIVISM 118–19 (2012).
561. Id. at 119.
562. Id. at 119–20.
563. EMPLOYERS FOR PAY EQUITY http://www.employersforpayequity.com/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2018); EQUAL PAY TODAY! CAMPAIGN, http://www.equalpaytoday.org/ (last
visited Sept. 30, 2018).
564. Lesley Stahl, Leading by Example to Close the Gender Pay Gap, CBS NEWS, 60 
MINUTES (Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/salesforce-ceo-marc-beni
off-leading-by-example-to-close-the-gender-pay-gap/; see also Cindy Robbins, 2017
Salesforce Equal Pay Assessment Update, SALESFORCE BLOG (Apr. 04, 2017)
https://www.salesforce.com/blog/2017/04/salesforce-equal-pay-assessment-update.
html.
565. GERBAUDO, supra note 560, at 102–03.
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companies can be targeted on their commitment to racial equity 
regarding hiring and promotion practices and demanded to take the 
Racial Equity Pledge.566  Modeled around the Equal Pay Pledge 
campaign,567 the Racial Equity Pledge can be a statement of a 
company’s intention to address the disparities in employment.568  A 
proposed pledge can incorporate a commitment to affirmative action: 
Employers have a critical role in reducing the racial 
disparity in economic progress.  Towards that end, we 
commit to making public the aggregate racial/ethnic data 
based on job categories; to adopt objective hiring and 
promotion processes and procedures to reduce unconscious 
bias and eliminate structural barriers; to set hiring and 
promotion goals to correct any identifiable deficiencies; to 
take all affirmative steps, including affirmative race-
conscious decision making, to achieve the goals; and to take 
all other necessary steps to ensure racial equity within our 
enterprise as well as our industry.569    
Furthermore, social media can reboot the “Don’t Shop Where You 
Can’t Work” campaigns of the early twentieth century.570  At the turn 
of the century, local civil rights groups from Chicago to Harlem 
began mobilizing these grassroots campaigns targeted at retail 
establishments like the five and dime stores that were located in 
black neighborhoods but rarely or never hired blacks for proportional 
representation in employment.571  Championed by black labor unions, 
the campaign began to spread to pressure utility, telephone, and 
566. See supra notes 517–61 and accompanying text.
567. White House Equal Pay Pledge, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/webform/white-house-equal-pay-pledge (last visited Dec. 20,
2018).
568. See generally Natalia Merluzzi, These Businesses are Taking the Equal Pay Pledge,
OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (June 14, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/blog/2016/06/14/businesses-taking-equal-pay-pledge (explaining that the
Equal Pay Pledge is a pledge proposed by the Obama administration for private sector
companies to take to commit to paying men and women equally in order to close the
gender pay gap).
569. See OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, supra note 567.
570. Oppenheimer, supra note 21, at 65; see Matt Lavietes, How Social Media is Shaping
Civil Rights Movements, RESOURCE (Jun. 14, 2017), http://resourcemagonline.com/
2017/06/how-social-media-is-shaping-civil-rights-movements/79054/.
571. Engstrom, supra note 22, at 1120–21; Oppenheimer, supra note 21, at 64–65; see
CAYTON, supra note 22, at 250.
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transit companies to hire black workers including in white-collar and 
managerial positions.572  
Dr. King took this concept nationwide during Operation 
Breadbasket, with support from the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC).573  From 1962 till his death in 1968, Dr. King 
led a campaign demanding proportional hiring of black workers, 
under threat of boycott.574  Operation Breadbasket campaigns 
demanded employment data from companies regarding the total 
number of workers in each job category and the number of black 
workers in each job category.575  The proportional quota was 
determined by the percentage of jobs compared to the number of 
black people in the city and the volume of business done in the 
“Black ghetto.”576  For example, if the black population is 20% in the 
city but the business does 30% of its business in the black 
community, then 30% of the jobs in this company should be held by 
blacks.577  Public pressure is easier to amplify in today’s social media 
and online culture and a rebooting of these old tactics, updated for 
the twenty-first century, can have a large impact.578 
Contrary to popular narrative that affirmative action programs have 
always been controversial, in the 1970s, during the normative climate 
of integration, there was broad support for affirmative action 
programs.579  A 1979 Wall Street Journal poll of top executives 
reported that nearly two-thirds favored government mandated 
affirmative action programs.580  Compensation of top-level managers 
and executives was tied to affirmative action compliance.581  Human 
resource management journals embraced voluntary hiring quotas as 
one effective tool to comply with Title VII.582  These management 
specialists believed that affirmative action practices were “essential 
572. Oppenheimer, supra note 21, at 65–66.
573. Id. at 77.
574. Id. at 76–77.
575. Id. at 77.
576. Id. at 77–78.
577. Id. at 77.  Five years later, Dr. King estimated that Operation Breadbasket secured
5000 new jobs and upgraded positions worth millions of dollars in annual income.  Id.
at 78.
578. See Lavietes, supra note 570.
579. Cf. Dobbin & Sutton, supra note 30, at 442–43 (exploring employer initiatives made
in response to changing federal employment laws).
580. Id. at 455.
581. Id. at 448.
582. Id.
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management tool[s] which reinforce[] accountability and maximize[] 
the utilization of the talents of [the] entire work force.”583  
Today, large employers have replaced affirmative action programs 
with diversity initiatives, at the same time championing affirmative 
action in education.584  In Grutter, Fisher I, and Fisher II, Fortune-
100 and other leading American business submitted amicus briefs in 
support of affirmative action in education.585  The main argument 
centered on the necessity of diversity to business success.586  These 
companies are global, international companies, serving and working 
with people and cultures of all kinds.587  Their briefs attest that 
“diversity is an increasingly critical component of their business, 
culture and planning.”588   
For example, in the Grutter amicus brief, Microsoft was heralded 
as increasing its percentage of minority employees, from 16.8% in 
1997 to 25.6% by 2003.589  However, this diversity was mostly 
accounted for by Asian males.590  Blacks made up only three percent 
of Microsoft’s workforce by 2014, slightly increasing to 3.7% in 
2016.591  These specific numbers by ethnicity were only released 
583. Id. at 455.
584. Roger Parloff, Big Business Asks Supreme Court to Save Affirmative Action, FORTUNE
(Dec. 9, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/09/supreme-court-affirmative-action/; see
also Vivian Yee, Affirmative Action Policies Evolve, Achieving Their Own Diversity,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/05/us/affirmative-act
ion-justice-department.html.
585. Brief for Amicus Curiae 65 Leading Am. Businesses in Support of Respondents,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399056; Brief for
Amici Curiae Fortune-100 and Other Leading Am. Businesses in Support of
Respondents, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11-345),
2012 WL 3418831; Brief for Fortune-100 and Other Leading Am. Businesses as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S.
Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 6735839.
586. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae 65 Leading Am. Businesses in Support of
Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399056, at *1; Brief for
Amici Curiae Fortune-100 and Other Leading Am. Businesses in Support of
Respondents, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3418831, at *1–
2; Brief for Fortune-100 and Other Leading Am. Businesses as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), 2015 WL
6735839, at *1–3.
587. Brief for Amicus Curiae 65 Leading Am. Businesses in Support of Respondents,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399056, at *1.
588. Id. at *8.
589. Id.
590. See Davey Alba, Microsoft Releases More Diversity Stats, and They Aren’t Pretty,
WIRED (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/01/microsoft-diversity/.
591. Id.; Gwen Houston, Global Diversity & Inclusion Update at Microsoft: Deepening
Our Commitment, MICROSOFT: OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Nov. 17, 2016), https://
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after activists pressured Microsoft to release its federal EEO-1 
reports, which broke down employment data by employees’ race, 
ethnicity, gender, and job category.592   
The numbers are just as dismal at other technology companies.593  
A 2014 analysis by USA Today of employment statistics from seven 
technology companies in Silicon Valley found that blacks made up 
only 5% of the companies’ total workforce, and only 2% of its 
technical workforce.594  While these companies attribute the disparity 
to a lack of qualified candidates, this is simply not the case, as there 
were twice as many black graduates that year with a bachelor’s 
degree in computer science or computer engineering from prestigious 
research universities.595 
Although large employers have invested millions of dollars in 
diversity initiatives including targeted outreach and recruitment, 
these have largely failed to deliver a critical mass of black and other 
underrepresented groups to their workforce.596  There is little 
resistance to affirmative outreach obligations to underrepresented 
communities.597  But, large employers have not embraced affirmative 
race-conscious decision-making.598  One reason is the erroneous 
assumption that such affirmative steps are prohibited by law.599  
blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/11/17/global-diversity-inclusion-update-microsoft-
deepening-commitment/. 
592. Alba, supra note 590 (speculating that transparency came as a result of a backlash
after Microsoft’s CEO said that women should not ask for raises but wait for
“karma”).  With the passage of Title VII, private sector employers with 100 or more
employees and federal contractors with 50 or more employees and federal contract of
$50,000 or more must submit EEO-1 reports.  EEO-1: Who Must File, U.S. EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY EMPL’T COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/who
mustfile.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
593. Alba, supra note 590 (noting that the percentages of Blacks and Latinos at Facebook
and Google are only 5%, compared to 8% at Microsoft).
594. Elisabeth Weise & Jessica Guynn, Tech Jobs: Minorities Have Degrees, But Don’t




596. See Tessa L. Dover, Brenda Major & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Diversity Policies Rarely
Make Companies Fairer, and They Feel Threatening to White Men, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Jan. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/01/diversity-policies-dont-help-women-or-minorit
ies-and-they-make-white-men-feel-threatened.
597. Id.
598. See id.; see supra text accompanying notes 584–95.
599. See DeSilver, supra note 549 (discussing the fact that affirmative action laws are
consistently altered on a state-by-state basis, often leaving employers uncertain of
current laws); Valerie Bolden-Barrett, For Tech Firms, It's ‘Yes’ to Hiring Diversity,
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Educating large employers about the legal validity and feasibility 
of affirmative race-conscious decision-making then should be the 
first step.  These employers, theoretically, already value diversity as a 
business necessity.  What they need is a roadmap on adopting 
voluntary affirmative action plans that can withstand challenges 
under Title VII. 
Weber provides the basic framework.600  A private employer 
should be able to adopt a plan that not only “break[s] down old 
patterns of racial segregation” but also disrupts contemporary 
discrimination and implicit bias in the workplace.601  Since Weber, 
ample empirical evidence has proven the existence of implicit bias 
and discriminatory practices in the labor market.602  New industries, 
like technology that are fairly homogenous,603 can embrace voluntary 
affirmative action as much as traditional industries like banking.   
An employer must compile evidence of racial segregation and 
hierarchy.  A preliminary step is a survey that factors in: 1) the 
percentage of the nonwhite population in the area; 2) the percentage 
of the nonwhite work force as compared with the total work force; 3) 
the size of the unemployed nonwhite work force; and 4) the 
availability of nonwhites having requisite skills in an area in which 
the employer can reasonably recruit.604  This analysis will help 
design “goals, timetables and affirmative action commitments" to 
correct any identifiable deficiencies.605   These numerical goals and 
timetables must be flexible and can be achieved through various 
means.   
Race-conscious training programs and internships provide an 
excellent vehicle to meet the remaining Weber factors.  These 
programs are by their nature temporary.  They can provide greater 
‘No’ to Affirmative Action, HR DIVE (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.hrdive.com/news/ 
for-tech-firms-its-yes-to-hiring-no-to-affirmative-action/433865/ (evidencing that 
employers often avoid affirmative action programs for fear of backlash from reverse 
discrimination proponents). 
600. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979).
601. Id. at 208.
602. See, e.g., Kevin Lang & Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann, Racial Discrimination in the Labor
Market: Theory and Empirics, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 959, 964–65 (2012) (noting
that in 2008, the unemployment rate for black men ages 25-54 years old was 9.1%
compared to 4.5% for white men of the same age range).
603. See Jessica Guynn, Tech Not Diverse Enough? That’s News to Workers, USA TODAY
(Mar. 22, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/03/22/
tech-is-already-diverse-enough-tech-workers-say-in-survey-from-atlassian/99457506/
(analyzing the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s report that found
that 68.5% of employees in the tech industry are white).
604. Hanson, supra note 22, at 254–55.
605. Id. at 255.
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opportunities for nonwhites but at the same time are not an absolute 
bar to white employees.  A training program or internship can even 
reserve a percentage of slots for blacks and other underrepresented 
groups, like the Weber training program did.606  Employers that argue 
that there are not enough qualified nonwhite candidates in their field 
should be pressed to create training programs and internships that use 
race-conscious criteria. 
Similarly, race-conscious hiring and promotion decisions, where 
race is but one factor, can pass statutory and constitutional muster.607  
Where a plan requires the taking away of an interest (such as an 
existing job or a guaranteed promotion based on a qualifying exam), 
it is more likely to be struck down.608  The Supreme Court disfavors 
the disparate treatment of individual white employees but recognizes 
that a more diffused burden is permissible.609  Because the Supreme 
Court has fluidly applied the analysis from the constitutional cases to 
Title VII statutory challenges, private employer can take guidance 
from the educational affirmative action cases.610  Hiring decisions 
should evaluate candidates individually and based on a set of criteria 
that is specific to that position.  Race acts as a plus factor that gives a 
preference to the nonwhite candidate.  As the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly cautioned, the plan must be flexible with individualized 
assessments.611 
Private employers can go a step further and try to justify their 
affirmative action hiring and promotion decisions under the diversity 
rationale approved in the educational cases.612  With globalization 
and an increasingly diverse nation, employers need to ensure that 
606. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197–98 (1979).
607. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641–42 (1987).
608. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281–84 (1986); Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 562–63, 585 (2009).
609. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282.
610. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (permitting race as a plus-factor in
admission decisions); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207
(2016) (holding the university’s race-conscious program did not violate the Equal
Protection clause).
611. E.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315, 334.
612. See generally Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter, 539
U.S. at 306; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297 (2013).  Private
employers should be cautious in importing wholesale the equal protection
jurisprudence.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Fisher I, 570 U.S.
297. While the Supreme Court has blurred the statutory and constitutional
boundaries, the heightened strict scrutiny standard is inappropriate to apply to purely
private actors.  Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
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workers at all levels of the labor market are diverse.613  As Justice 
O’Connor recognized in the educational setting, “[i]n order to 
cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, 
it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented 
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.”614  Finally, 
Ricci allows private employers to adopt voluntary affirmative action 
plans to avoid disparate impact liability.615  While it is unclear 
whether private employers would need to show the same “strong 
basis in evidence” as public employers, they will need to show more 
than “mere good-faith fear” of disparate impact liability.616  
Amorphous claims of disparate impact liability will not justify 
“unyielding racial quota[s].”617  
The time is ripe to pressure large employers, especially technology 
companies, to embrace voluntary affirmative action plans that 
include race conscious decision-making.618  In a survey of technology 
workers, nearly half said that the 2016 presidential election has made 
them care more about promoting diversity in their company, and a 
quarter of the respondents have taken proactive steps to engage with 
their colleagues and leadership about a more inclusive workplace.619 
Unions must be equally engaged to pressure employers to adopt 
affirmative action plans and also help encourage the Democratic 
political leadership to re-embrace affirmative action programs.620  
Historically, blacks were excluded by unions; today, they have a 
higher union membership rate than any other ethnicity.621  By the 
early 1970s, nearly 40% of black males were union members in the 
private sector.622  Unionization rates for blacks have exceeded those 
of whites for decades.623  Unionization has provided blacks with 
protection against discriminatory treatment and reduced wage 
613. Weise & Guynn, supra note 594.
614. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
615. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 581 (2009).
616. See id. at 581–83.
617. Id. at 583 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989)).
618. See Weise & Guynn, supra note 594.
619. Id.
620. See discussion infra notes 621–34 and accompanying text.
621. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., supra note 184 at 1–2; Rosenfeld & Kleykamp, supra note
62, at 1463–64, 1466–67.
622. See Rosenfeld & Kleykamp, supra note 62, at 1463.
623. Id.
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inequality among black women.624  The current decline of unions has 
correspondingly impacted black economic progress.625   
Although blacks overwhelmingly gravitate towards unions and take 
union staffer and leadership roles, unions have adopted the colorblind 
adage.626  But as unions depend on black and immigrant workers for 
their growth, they have started to take a leadership role in centering 
discussion on race and economic progress.627  In a study 
commissioned by the AFL-CIO to assess its own internal equity 
policies, an overwhelming number of respondents supported the 
adoption of specific numerical requirements that promote diversity in 
delegates attending national conventions.628  The AFL-CIO 
constitution was amended accordingly, requiring affiliated unions to 
ensure that their delegations to the convention “generally reflect the 
racial and gender diversity of its membership.”629  In 2015, the AFL-
CIO created the Labor Commission on Racial and Economic Justice 
to examine how issues of race can be better addressed by the labor 
movement.630  
If the labor movement can embrace affirmative action as one tool 
to help combat the racial disparity in employment, there will be 
ripple effects on the political landscape.  Unions play a central role in 
the Democratic Party through contributions and volunteers that 
mobilize and turn out voters.631  A revolution in the Democratic Party 
is already underway, fueled by the candidacy of Bernie Sanders, 
towards a more progressive agenda.632  Unions can tip the balance on 
624. Id. at 1460, 1462; Cherri Bucknor, Black Workers, Unions and Inequality, CTR. FOR
ECON. & POL’Y RES. 12, 16–17 (Aug. 2016), http://cepr.net/publications/reports/black
-workers-unions-and-inequality.
625. See Rosenfeld & Kleykamp, supra note 62, at 1484, 1487; Bucknor, supra note 624,
at 16–17.
626. See Marion Crain, Whitewashed Labor Law, Skinwalking Unions, 23 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 211, 229 (2002); MARC BAYARD, PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE LABOR
MOVEMENT AND BLACK WORKERS: THE OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND NEXT 
STEPS 1 (Apr. 2015), https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MarcReport.pdf.
627. See generally O’Melveny, supra note 62.
628. Id. at 529.
629. Id. at 523.
630. AM. FED’N L. & CONGRESS INDUS. ORGS., supra note 59.
631. See James Feigenbaum et al., Demobilizing Democrats and Labor Unions: Political
Effects of Right to Work Laws 13 (Oct. 4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://businessinnovation.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/rtw-laws-manu
script_oct2017.pdf.
632. Alexander Burns, There Is a Revolution on the Left.  Democrats Are Bracing., N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/us/politics/democratic-
party-midterms.html.
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issues like affirmative action within the Democratic Party.633  Once a 
mainstay of Democratic Party platforms, affirmative action has fallen 
out of favor with mainstream Democrats as being too 
controversial.634    
While the addition of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court tips 
the balance against affirmative action,635  I remain optimistic in the 
long run that public pressure coupled with an effective Congress can 
shift the judiciary into upholding narrowly tailored affirmative action 
plans to further the goals of Title VII.636 
VI. CONCLUSION
The unfinished work on racial equality that abruptly halted in the
1980s must be reinvigorated in the employment arena.637  
Affirmative action is one effective tool to combat discrimination and 
stem the widening economic disparity between blacks and whites.638  
Using affirmative action to increase black employment is both 
constitutionally639 and statutorily viable.640  While the Supreme Court 
has narrowly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, frustrating the 
intent and purpose of the Amendment, it has not shut its door on 
affirmative action.641  In the employment context, there is a greater 
opportunity for constitutionally valid affirmative action plans.642  The 
633. See id.
634. Cf. id. (stating generally that there are many progressive policies that people want that
are not being supported by mainstream Democrats).
635. Eoin Higgins, Yale Legacy Admission Brett Kavanaugh is Now the Swing Vote on
Affirmative Action at Universities, INTERCEPT (Oct. 8, 2018, 4:36 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/10/08/brett-kavanaugh-affirmative-action-at-universitie
s/.
636. The genesis of wage and hour legislation at the turn of the twentieth century is a case
in point.  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525, 561–62 (1923); Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 19, 113–14 (2000).  As states
began to affirmatively set maximum hours and minimum wages, the Supreme Court
in the Lochner era struck down these laws as “repugnant” to due process.  Lochner,
198 U.S. at 64.  Eventually, the Supreme Court shifted as a result of a deft political
move by President Roosevelt who was frustrated by the restrictive view of the
Supreme Court.  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 449 (Found.
Press ed., 1978).  At the same time, a national movement advocating for federal and
state wage and hour legislation was growing.  See Harris, supra, at 46–48.
637. See supra notes 181–85 and accompanying text.
638. See supra notes 241–51 and accompanying text.
639. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
640. See supra notes 488–89 and accompanying text.
641. See supra notes 336–41 and accompanying text.
642. See supra notes 431–32 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has approved of affirmative action plans in 
educational institutions and to remedy past discrimination in public 
employment.643  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has approved of 
voluntary affirmative action plans adopted by private employers 
under Title VII as a means to effectuate the purpose of Title VII.644 
Affirmative action has been decimated through the normative shift 
brought about by the Reagan Administration’s efforts to frame it as 
reverse discrimination.645  Reagan assaulted affirmative action to 
brazenly appease white racial anxiety.646  Reagan launched his 
presidential campaign in Philadelphia, Mississippi—a town made 
famous by the murder of three civil rights workers—and opposed the 
Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 
and a federal holiday honoring Dr. King.647  The Reagan 
Administration’s offensive to dismantle and disinvest in the civil 
rights infrastructure is coming full circle with the Trump 
presidency.648   
The time is ripe to muster the political will to overcome the stasis 
on affirmative action in employment.649  Key leadership of civil 
rights organizations, private employers, unions and grassroots 
community activists should embrace employment equity as a 
pressing civil rights issues.650  The widening economic gap between 
whites and blacks is a national disgrace.651  We must reignite the 
quest for equality in employment by re-embracing affirmative action 
in private employment.652  
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